A C++ Platform For The Evolution Of Trade Networks
This paper presents a general C++ platform for the implementation of a trade network game (TNG) that combines evolutionary game play with preferential partner selection. In the TNG, successive generations of resource constrained traders choose and refuse trade partners on the basis of continually updated expected payoffs, engage in risky trades modelled as two-person games, and evolve their trade strategies over time. The modular design of the TNG platform facilitates experimentation with alternative specifications for market structure, trade partner matching, trading, expectation formation, and trade strategy evolution. The TNG platform can be used to study the evolutionary implications of these specifications at three different levels: individual trader attributes; trade network formation; and social welfare.
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- Richard R. Nelson, 1995. "Recent Evolutionary Theorizing about Economic Change," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 33(1), pages 48-90, March.
- Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1997.
"A Trade Network Game with Endogenous Partner Selection,"
Staff General Research Papers
1680, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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- Ashlock, Daniel & Smucker, Mark D. & Stanley, E. Ann & Tesfatsion, Leigh S., 1996.
"Preferential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoner's Dilemma,"
Staff General Research Papers
1687, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Dan Ashlock & Mark D. Smucker & E. Ann Stanley & Leigh Tesfatsion, 1995. "Preferential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoner's Dilemma," Game Theory and Information 9501002, EconWPA, revised 20 Jan 1995.
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37, Iowa State University Department of Economics.
- Stanley, E.A. & Ashlock, Daniel & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1994. "Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal of Partners," Staff General Research Papers 11180, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Alan P. Kirman, 1992. "Whom or What Does the Representative Individual Represent?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 117-136, Spring.
- Ulrich Witt, 2006. "Evolutionary Economics," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2006-05, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
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