Preferential Partner Selection in Evolutionary Labor Markets: A Study in Agent-Based Computational Economics
This paper reports on computational experiments for an agent-based computational economics (ACE) model of a labor market with choice and refusal of contractual partners and endogenously evolving work-site behaviors. Three types of labor market structures are examined: two-sided markets comprising workers and employers; partially fluid markets comprising pure workers, pure employers, and agents capable of functioning both as workers and employers; and endogenous-type markets in which each agent is capable of functioning as both a worker and an employer. Particular attention is focused on experimentally determined correlations between market structure and the formation and evolution of contractual networks, and between contractual network formation and the types of work-site interactions and social welfare outcomes that these contractual networks support. Related work can be accessed at: http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/tnghome.htm
|Date of creation:||01 Jan 1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070|
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