A C++ Platform for the Evolution of Trade Networks
This paper presents a general C++ platform for the implementation of a trade network game (TNG) that combines evolutionary game play with preferential partner selection. In the TNG, successive generations of resource constrained traders choose and refuse trade partners on the basis of continually updated expected payoffs, engage in risky trades modelled as two-person games, and evolve their trade strategies over time. The modular design of the TNG platform facilitates experimentation with alternative specifications for market structure, trade partner matching, trading, expectation formation, and trade strategy evolution. The TNG platform can be used to study the evolutionary implications of these specifications at three different levels: individual trader attributes, trade network formation, and social welfare. Citation Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Volume (Year): 14 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (October)
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