The Evolutionary Robustness of Forgiveness and Cooperation
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- Ravi Bapna & Liangfei Qiu & Sarah Rice, 2014. "Repeated Interactions vs. Social Ties: Quantifying the Economic Value of Trust, Forgiveness, and Reputation Using a Field Experiment," Working Papers 14-07, NET Institute.
More about this item
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-07-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2013-07-05 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2013-07-05 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2013-07-05 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2013-07-05 (Microeconomics)
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