My bibliography  Save this paper

# Almost global convergence to p-dominant equilibrium

## Author

Listed:
• Sandholm,W.H.

(University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute)

## Abstract

A population of players repeatedly plays an n strategy symmetric game. Players update their strategies by sampling the behavior of k opponents and playing a best response to the distribution of strategies in the sample. Suppose the game possesses a ${1 \over k}$-dominant strategy which is initially played by a positive fraction of the population. Then if the population size is large enough, play converges to the ${1 \over k}$-dominant equilibrium with arbitrarily high probability.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

## Suggested Citation

• Sandholm,W.H., 1999. "Almost global convergence to p-dominant equilibrium," Working papers 37, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
• Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:199937
as

File URL: http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~whs/research/gc.pdf
---><---

## References listed on IDEAS

as
1. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-1071, September.
2. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
3. Morris, Stephen & Rob, Rafael & Shin, Hyun Song, 1995. "Dominance and Belief Potential," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 145-157, January.
4. Saez-Marti, Maria & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1999. "Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 268-279, June.
5. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
6. Kaniovski Yuri M. & Young H. Peyton, 1995. "Learning Dynamics in Games with Stochastic Perturbations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 330-363, November.
7. Hurkens Sjaak, 1995. "Learning by Forgetful Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 304-329, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

## Most related items

These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
1. Blume, Andreas & Arnold, Tone, 2004. "Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 240-259, February.
2. Wallace, Chris & Young, H. Peyton, 2015. "Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
3. H Peyton Young, 2014. "The Evolution of Social Norms," Economics Series Working Papers 726, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
4. Peyton Young, H., 1998. "Individual learning and social rationality1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 651-663, May.
5. , & , H. & ,, 2015. "Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
6. Jonathan Newton, 2018. "Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-67, May.
7. Matros, Alexander, 2003. "Clever agents in adaptive learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 110-124, July.
8. Josephson, Jens, 2009. "Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1543-1554, August.
9. Abhimanyu Khan & Ronald Peeters, 2014. "Cognitive hierarchies in adaptive play," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(4), pages 903-924, November.
10. Kevin Hasker, 2014. "The Emergent Seed: A Representation Theorem for Models of Stochastic Evolution and two formulas for Waiting Time," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000954, David K. Levine.
11. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998.
12. Agastya, Murali, 2004. "Stochastic stability in a double auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 203-222, August.
13. Maruta, Toshimasa, 1997. "On the Relationship between Risk-Dominance and Stochastic Stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 221-234, May.
14. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry & Young, Peyton, 2003. "Equilibrium selection in bargaining models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 296-328, November.
15. Blume, Andreas, 1998. "Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 171-202, February.
16. Ben-Shoham, Assaf & Serrano, Roberto & Volij, Oscar, 2004. "The evolution of exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 310-328, February.
17. Kaniovski, Yuri M. & Kryazhimskii, Arkadii V. & Young, H. Peyton, 2000. "Adaptive Dynamics in Games Played by Heterogeneous Populations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 50-96, April.
18. Jean-Paul Carvalho, 2017. "Coordination and culture," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(3), pages 449-475, October.
19. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Nick Netzer, 2015. "Robust stochastic stability," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 31-57, January.
20. Ellingsen, Tore & Robles, Jack, 2002. "Does Evolution Solve the Hold-Up Problem?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 28-53, April.

## Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:att:wimass:199937. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: .

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ailsenne Sumwalt (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.