Clever agents in adaptive learning
Saez-Marti and Weibull  investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's  bargaining model. This is how they introduce ''cleverness'' of players. We analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games. We show that Young's  prediction is robust: adaptive learning with clever agents does select the same minimal curb set as in the absence of clever agents, if their population share is less than one. However, the long-run strategies distribution in such a curb set may vary with the share of clever agents.
|Date of creation:||03 Oct 2000|
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- Weibull, Jörgen W. & Saez-Marti, Maria, 1998.
"Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model,"
Working Paper Series
507, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Saez-Marti, Maria & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1999. "Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 268-279, June.
- Saez-Marti, Maria & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1998. "Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 281, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Basu, K. & Weibull, J., 1990.
"Strategy Subsets Closed Under Rational Behavior,"
62, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
- Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
- Hurkens Sjaak, 1995. "Learning by Forgetful Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 304-329, November.
- Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
- P. Young, 1999. "The Evolution of Conventions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 485, David K. Levine.
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