Clever agents in adaptive learning
Saez-Marti and Weibull  investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's  bargaining model. This is how they introduce ''cleverness'' of players. We analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games. We show that Young's  prediction is robust: adaptive learning with clever agents does select the same minimal curb set as in the absence of clever agents, if their population share is less than one. However, the long-run strategies distribution in such a curb set may vary with the share of clever agents.
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- Basu, K. & Weibull, J.W., 1990.
"Strategy Subsets Closed Under Rational Behaviour,"
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- Saez-Marti, Maria & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1999.
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- Saez-Marti, Maria & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1998. "Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 281, Stockholm School of Economics.
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