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Adaptive learning and p-best response sets

Author

Listed:
  • Jacques Durieu

    (CREG - Centre de recherche en économie de Grenoble - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2)

  • Philippe Solal

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Olivier Tercieux

    (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

A product set of strategies is a p-best response set if for each agent it contains all best responses to any distribution placing at least probability p on his opponents' profiles belonging to the product set. A p-best response set is minimal if it does not properly contain another p-best response set. We study a perturbed joint fictitious play process with bounded memory and sample and a perturbed independent fictitious play process as in Young (Econometrica 61:57-84, ). We show that in n-person games only strategies contained in the unique minimal p-best response set can be selected in the long run by both types of processes provided that the rate of perturbations and p are sufficiently low. For each process, an explicit bound of p is given and we analyze how this critical value evolves when n increases. Our results are robust to the degree of incompleteness of sampling relative to memory.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacques Durieu & Philippe Solal & Olivier Tercieux, 2011. "Adaptive learning and p-best response sets," Post-Print halshs-00740164, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00740164
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    Cited by:

    1. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Andrey Meshalkin & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2020. "Optimality, Equilibrium, and Curb Sets in Decision Problems Without Commitment," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 478-492, June.
    2. Desgranges, Gabriel & Gauthier, Stéphane, 2016. "Rationalizability and efficiency in an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 163-176.
    3. Barthel, Anne-Christine & Hoffmann, Eric & Sabarwal, Tarun, 2022. "Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 201-219.
    4. Anne-Christine Barthel & Eric Hoffmann & Tarun Sabarwal, 2021. "A Unified Approach to p-Dominance and its Generalizations in Games with Strategic Complements and Substitutes," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 202109, University of Kansas, Department of Economics.
    5. Jacques Durieu & Philippe Solal, 2012. "Models of Adaptive Learning in Game Theory," Chapters, in: Richard Arena & Agnès Festré & Nathalie Lazaric (ed.), Handbook of Knowledge and Economics, chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Maruta, Toshimasa & Okada, Akira, 2012. "Stochastically stable equilibria in n-person binary coordination games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 31-42.
    7. J. Durieu & P. Solal, 2014. "Local Interactions and p‐Best Response Set," Journal of Applied Mathematics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 2014(1).

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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