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Local interactions and p-best response set

  • Jacques Durieu

    ()

    (CREG - Centre de recherche en économie de Grenoble - Grenoble 2 UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France)

  • Philippe Solal

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - CNRS)

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    We study a local interaction model where agents play a finite n-person game following a perturbed best-response process with inertia. We consider the concept of minimal p-best response set to analyze distributions of actions in the long run. We distinguish between two assumptions made by agents about the matching rule. We show that only actions contained in the minimal p-best response set can be selected provided p is sufficiently small. We demonstrate that these predictions are sensitive to the assumptions about the matching rule.

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    File URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01002448/document
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    Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-01002448.

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    Date of creation: 2014
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    Publication status: Published in Journal of Applied Mathematics, Hindawi Publishing Corporation, 2014, vol. 2014, 7 p. <10.1155/2014/415686>
    Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01002448
    DOI: 10.1155/2014/415686
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01002448
    Contact details of provider: Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

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    1. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
    2. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September.
    3. Simon Weidenholzer, 2010. "Coordination Games and Local Interactions: A Survey of the Game Theoretic Literature," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 1(4), pages 551, November.
    4. Alos-Ferrer, Carlos & Weidenholzer, Simon, 2007. "Partial bandwagon effects and local interactions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 179-197, November.
    5. Jacques Durieu & Philippe Solal & Olivier Tercieux, 2011. "Adaptive learning and p-best response sets," Post-Print halshs-00740164, HAL.
    6. Olivier Tercieux, 2006. "p-Best response set," Post-Print halshs-00754120, HAL.
    7. Glenn Ellison, 2000. "Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(1), pages 17-45.
    8. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
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