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Rent-seeking models of international competition: An experimental investigation

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  • Bruce Linster
  • Richard Fullerton
  • Michael Mckee
  • Stephen Slate

Abstract

This paper experimentally tests a number of hypotheses that follow from models of international competition that are based on Tullock style rent-seeking models. Specifically, we designed and performed experiments to see how variations in the degree of publicness in the prize as well as changes in the values assigned to the prize affect alliances in terms of individual nation contributions, total contributions, burden sharing, and the likelihood of winning the prize. While there was substantial variation in individual behavior, the results of the experiments generally conform to the theoretical predictions of the rent-seeking model of international competition and alliances.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruce Linster & Richard Fullerton & Michael Mckee & Stephen Slate, 2001. "Rent-seeking models of international competition: An experimental investigation," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(4), pages 285-302.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:12:y:2001:i:4:p:285-302
    DOI: 10.1080/10430710108404989
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2015. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 609-669, December.
    2. Kimbrough, Erik & Sheremeta, Roman, 2014. "Why can’t we be friends? Entitlements and the costs of conflict," MPRA Paper 53253, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Turocy, Theodore L., 2014. "Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 224-238.
    4. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Roman M. Sheremeta & Theodore L. Turocy, 2012. "Overdissipation and Convergence in Rent-seeking Experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules," Working Papers 12-13, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.

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