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Reconsidering publicness in alliance defence expenditures: NATO expansion and burden sharing

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  • William Gates
  • Katsuaki Terasawa

Abstract

Over the past several decades, NATO allies have debated the relative burdens and benefits of NATO membership. Recently, this concern surfaced as members debated the magnitude and distribution of NATO expansion costs. This paper presents an economic model of defence alliances to identify the benefits and burdens of alliance membership. It suggests that defence expenditures provide public benefits if alliance members share common interests and mutual commitment; defence expenditures provide private benefits if countries lack common interests and mutual commitment. The model's results are used to discuss NATO's evolving roles and missions, NATO expansion and burden sharing across NATO members.

Suggested Citation

  • William Gates & Katsuaki Terasawa, 2003. "Reconsidering publicness in alliance defence expenditures: NATO expansion and burden sharing," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(5), pages 369-383.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:14:y:2003:i:5:p:369-383
    DOI: 10.1080/10242690302924
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Becker Jordan & Kuokštytė Ringailė & Kuokštis Vytautas, 2023. "The Political Economy of Transatlantic Security – A Policy Perspective," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 55-77, June.
    3. Renaud Bellais & Martial Foucault & Jean-Michel Oudot, 2014. "Économie de la défense," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01052607, HAL.
    4. Marek Loužek, 2009. "Ekonomie bezpečnosti - jsou teroristé racionální? [Economics of security - are terrorists rational?]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2009(2), pages 177-193.
    5. Gupta, Dhruv & Sriram, Karthik, 2018. "Impact of security expenditures in military alliances on violence from non-state actors: Evidence from India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 338-357.
    6. Jomana Amara, 2008. "Nato Defense Expenditures: Common Goals Or Diverging Interests? A Structural Analysis," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(6), pages 449-469.

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