Export Controls, Market Structure and International Coordination
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- Maria del Carmen Garcia-Alonso & Keith Hartley, 2000. "Export controls, market structure and international coordination," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 481-503.
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More about this item
KeywordsArms Control; Coordination Games; International Agreements;
- F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2000-03-13 (All new papers)
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