Management of Transnational Commons: Coordination, Publicness, and Treaty Formation
This paper focuses on the formation of treaties to manage transnational commons when efforts must be coordinated among a minimal-sized group so as to make cooperation worthwhile. By focusing on mixed-strategy equilibria, we are concerned with instances where the intentions of others are uncertain. The number of required participants, the pattern of payoffs, transaction costs, and the underlying technology of public supply aggregation are key factors behind the achievement of coordination. We apply our analysis to explain the outcome of negotiations on stratospheric ozone depletion, global warming, acid rain, and tropical deforestation.
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