The Arms Trade and Arms Control
This paper constructs a dynamic model of the arms trade in which there are a small number of suppliers who care about the profits from the trade and the security consequences of the sale and a large number of interacting buyers who are concerned about their security relative to regional rivals. The authors derive the equilibrium under a number of assumptions about market structure. This model is then used to evaluate the benefits and sustainability of a proposed arms control regime that involves establishing a cartel of suppliers, taxing arms exports, and distributing the proceeds to recipients. Copyright 1995 by Royal Economic Society.
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Volume (Year): 105 (1995)
Issue (Month): 429 (March)
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