Bilateral or multilateral bargaining in the face of global environmental change?
This model deals with the problem of the greenhouse effect—a problem of transfrontier pollution. It consists of determining, through the description of a bargaining process, the conditions under which it is preferable for the developing countries to speak with a united voice, and those conditions under which it is preferable for them to negotiate separately one from the other. In particular it is shown that the agreements arising from the bargaining cannot be equitable, and for that reason they include only a limited number of countries.
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-64, November.
- Barrett, Scott, 1990. "The Problem of Global Environmental Protection," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 68-79, Spring.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
252, David K. Levine.
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993.
"Strategies for the international protection of the environment,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1991. "Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment," CEPR Discussion Papers 568, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1992. "The international dimension of environmental policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 379-387, April.
- John Whalley & Randall Wigle, 1991. "Cutting CO2 Emissions: The Effects of Alternative Policy Approaches," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 109-124.
- Gilles Rotillon & Tarik Tazdaït, 1996. "International bargaining in the presence of global environmental change," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(3), pages 293-314, October.
- Hoel, Michael, 1992. "Carbon taxes : An international tax or harmonized domestic taxes?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 400-406, April.
- Alan S. Manne & Richard G. Richels, 1991. "Global CO2 Emission Reductions - the Impacts of Rising Energy Costs," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 87-108.
- Keohane, Robert O., 1986. "Reciprocity in international relations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(01), pages 1-27, December.
- Michael Hoel, 1991.
"Efficient International Agreements for Reducing Emissions of CO2,"
The Energy Journal,
International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 93-108.
- Hoel, M., 1990. "Efficient International Agreements For Reducing Emissions Of Co2," Memorandum 06/1990, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
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