Tarik Tazdaït

Personal Details

First Name:	Tarik
Middle Name:
Last Name:	Tazdaït
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:	pta187
	[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement (CIRED)

Paris, France
http://www.centre-cired.fr/

: +33 (0)1 43 94 73 73
+33 (0)1 43 94 73 70
Jardin d'Agronomie Tropicale de Paris, 45 bis Avenue de la Belle Gabrielle, F-94736 Nogent sur Marne Cedex
RePEc:edi:ciredfr (more details at EDIRC)

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

1. Olivier Musy & Antonin Pottier & Tarik Tazdaït, 2012. "A New Theorem to Find Berge Equilibria," Post-Print hal-01385826, HAL.
   • Olivier Musy & Antonin Pottier & Tarik Tazdait, 2012. "A New Theorem To Find Berge Equilibria," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 14(01), pages 1-10.

   Cited by:

   1. Bertrand Crettez, 2017. "A New Sufficient Condition for a Berge Equilibrium to be a Berge–Vaisman Equilibrium," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), vol. 15(3), pages 451-459, September.
   2. Bertrand Crettez, 2017. "On Sugden’s “mutually beneficial practice” and Berge equilibrium," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 64(4), pages 357-366, December.
   3. Ahmad Nahhas & H. W. Corley, 2017. "A Nonlinear Programming Approach to Determine a Generalized Equilibrium for N-Person Normal Form Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(03), pages 1-15, September.
   4. Rabia Nessah, 2014. "Berge–Vaisman and Nash Equilibria: Transformation of Games," Post-Print hal-01111099, HAL.
      • Antonin Pottier & Rabia Nessah, 2014. "Berge–Vaisman And Nash Equilibria: Transformation Of Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 16(04), pages 1-8.
      • Antonin Pottier & Rabia Nessah, 2014. "Berge–Vaisman And Nash Equilibria: Transformation Of Games," Post-Print hal-01083736, HAL.
   5. Rabia Nessah & Moussa Larbani, 2014. "Berge–Zhukovskii Equilibria: Existence And Characterization," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 16(04), pages 1-11.
   6. Schouten, Jop & Borm, Peter & Hendrickx, Ruud, 2018. "Unilateral Support Equilibria," Discussion Paper 2018-011, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

2. A.M. Colman & T.W. Körner & O. Musy & T. Tazdaït, 2011. "Mutual support in games: Some properties of Berge equilibria," Post-Print hal-00716357, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. Courtois, Pierre & Nessah, Rabia & Tazdaït, Tarik, 2017. "Existence and computation of Berge equilibrium and of two refinements," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 7-15.
   2. Bertrand Crettez, 2017. "A New Sufficient Condition for a Berge Equilibrium to be a Berge–Vaisman Equilibrium," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), vol. 15(3), pages 451-459, September.
   3. Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "What does “we” want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 128(3), pages 311-332.
      • Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "What does “we” want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours," Post-Print halshs-01858190, HAL.
      • Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "What Does 'We' Want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours," Working Papers halshs-01837218, HAL.
      • Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "What Does 'We' Want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours," GREDEG Working Papers 2018-17, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.
   4. Bertrand Crettez, 2017. "On Sugden’s “mutually beneficial practice” and Berge equilibrium," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 64(4), pages 357-366, December.
   5. Ahmad Nahhas & H. W. Corley, 2017. "A Nonlinear Programming Approach to Determine a Generalized Equilibrium for N-Person Normal Form Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(03), pages 1-15, September.
   6. Rabia Nessah, 2014. "Berge–Vaisman and Nash Equilibria: Transformation of Games," Post-Print hal-01111099, HAL.
      • Antonin Pottier & Rabia Nessah, 2014. "Berge–Vaisman And Nash Equilibria: Transformation Of Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 16(04), pages 1-8.
      • Antonin Pottier & Rabia Nessah, 2014. "Berge–Vaisman And Nash Equilibria: Transformation Of Games," Post-Print hal-01083736, HAL.
   7. Bertrand Crettez, 2017. "On Hobbes’s state of nature and game theory," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(4), pages 499-511, December.
   8. Schouten, Jop & Borm, Peter & Hendrickx, Ruud, 2018. "Unilateral Support Equilibria," Discussion Paper 2018-011, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

3. Pierre Courtois & Rabia Nessah & Tarik Tazdaït, 2011. "How to play the games? Nash versus Berge behavior rules," Working Papers 11-05, LAMETA, Universitiy of Montpellier, revised Feb 2011.

   Cited by:

   1. Olivier Musy & Antonin Pottier & Tarik Tazdait, 2012. "A New Theorem To Find Berge Equilibria," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 14(01), pages 1-10.
      • Olivier Musy & Antonin Pottier & Tarik Tazdaït, 2012. "A New Theorem to Find Berge Equilibria," Post-Print hal-01385826, HAL.
   2. Rabia Nessah, 2014. "Berge–Vaisman and Nash Equilibria: Transformation of Games," Post-Print hal-01111099, HAL.
      • Antonin Pottier & Rabia Nessah, 2014. "Berge–Vaisman And Nash Equilibria: Transformation Of Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 16(04), pages 1-8.
      • Antonin Pottier & Rabia Nessah, 2014. "Berge–Vaisman And Nash Equilibria: Transformation Of Games," Post-Print hal-01083736, HAL.
   3. Rabia Nessah & Moussa Larbani, 2014. "Berge–Zhukovskii Equilibria: Existence And Characterization," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 16(04), pages 1-11.

4. Pierre Courtois & Tarik Tazdaït, 2011. "Learning to trust strangers: an evolutionary perspective," Working Papers 11-06, LAMETA, Universitiy of Montpellier, revised Feb 2011.
   • Pierre Courtois & Tarik Tazdaït, 2012. "Learning to trust strangers: an evolutionary perspective," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 367-383, April.
   • Pierre Courtois & Tarik Tazdaït, 2012. "Learning to trust strangers: an evolutionary perspective," Post-Print hal-00715459, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. Jean Paul Rabanal & Daniel Friedman, 2015. "How Moral Codes Evolve in a Trust Game," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 6(2), pages 1-11, June.

5. A. Caparrós & E. Giraud-Héraud & A. Hammoudi & T. Tazdaït, 2011. "Coalition stability with heterogeneous agents," Post-Print hal-00716327, HAL.
   • Alejandro Caparrós & Eric Giraud-Héraud & Abdelhakim Hammoudi & Tarik Tazdaït, 2011. "Coalition Stability with Heterogeneous Agents," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(1), pages 286-296.

   Cited by:

   1. Alejandro Caparros & Michael Finus, 2016. "Public Good Agreements under the Weakest-link Technology," Department of Economics Working Papers 52/16, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
      • Alejandro Caparrós & Michael Finus, 2016. "Public good agreements under the weakest-link technology," Working Papers 1602, Instituto de Políticas y Bienes Públicos (IPP), CSIC.
   2. Adam N. Walker & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2016. "Farsightedness, Changing Stock Location and the Stability of International Fisheries Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(3), pages 591-611, March.
      • Adam Walker & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2016. "Farsightedness, Changing Stock Location and the Stability of International Fisheries Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(3), pages 591-611, March.
   3. van der Pol, Thomas & Weikard, Hans-Peter & van Ierland, Ekko, 2012. "Can altruism stabilise international climate agreements?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 112-120.
   4. Cristina Grazia & François Gusdorf & Abdelhakim Hammoudi, 2014. "Climate Change, Heterogeneities, and Stability of International Fiscal Harmonization," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 58(4), pages 579-603, August.

6. Rabia Nessah & Moussa Larbani & Tarik Tazdait, 2009. "On Berge Equilibria," Working Papers 2010-ECO-16, IESEG School of Management.
   • Tarik Tazdaït & Moussa Larbani & Rabia Nessah, 2007. "On Berge Equilibrium," CIRED Working Papers halshs-00271452, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. Tarik Tazdaït & Moussa Larbani & Rabia Nessah, 2007. "On Berge Equilibrium," CIRED Working Papers halshs-00271452, HAL.
      • Rabia Nessah & Moussa Larbani & Tarik Tazdait, 2009. "On Berge Equilibria," Working Papers 2010-ECO-16, IESEG School of Management.
   2. Tarik Tazdaït & Moussa Larbani & Rabia Nessah, 2007. "Strong Berge and Pareto Equilibrium Existence for a Noncooperative Game," CIRED Working Papers halshs-00271464, HAL.
   3. Messaoud Deghdak & Monique Florenzano, 2011. "On the existence of Berge's strong equilibrium," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 11039, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
      • Messaoud Deghdak & Monique Florenzano, 2011. "On The Existence Of Berge'S Strong Equilibrium," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 13(03), pages 325-340.
      • Messaoud Deghdak & Monique Florenzano, 2011. "On the existence of Berge's strong equilibrium," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00611851, HAL.
   4. M. Larbani & R. Nessah, 2008. "A note on the existence of Berge and Berge–Nash equilibria," Post-Print hal-00257205, HAL.
      • Larbani, Moussa & Nessah, Rabia, 2008. "A note on the existence of Berge and Berge-Nash equilibria," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 258-271, March.
   5. Rabia Nessah & Raluca Parvulescu, 2017. "On the Existence of Pareto Efficient Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(03), pages 1-13, September.
      • Rabia Nessah & Raluca Parvulescu, 2017. "On the Existence of Pareto Efficient Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games," Post-Print hal-01744605, HAL.
   6. Tarik Tazdaït & Moussa Larbani & Rabia Nessah, 2007. "Strong Berge and Pareto Equilibrium Existence for a Noncooperative Game," Working Papers halshs-00271464, HAL.

7. R. Nessah & M. Larbani & T. Tazdait, 2007. "A note on Berge equilibrium," Post-Print hal-00716706, HAL.
   • R. Nessah & M. Larbani & T. Tazdait, 2007. "A note on Berge equilibrium," Post-Print hal-00204224, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. Courtois, Pierre & Nessah, Rabia & Tazdaït, Tarik, 2017. "Existence and computation of Berge equilibrium and of two refinements," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 7-15.
   2. M. Larbani & R. Nessah, 2008. "A note on the existence of Berge and Berge–Nash equilibria," Post-Print hal-00257205, HAL.
      • Larbani, Moussa & Nessah, Rabia, 2008. "A note on the existence of Berge and Berge-Nash equilibria," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 258-271, March.
   3. Ahmad Nahhas & H. W. Corley, 2017. "A Nonlinear Programming Approach to Determine a Generalized Equilibrium for N-Person Normal Form Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(03), pages 1-15, September.
   4. Rabia Nessah, 2014. "Berge–Vaisman and Nash Equilibria: Transformation of Games," Post-Print hal-01111099, HAL.
      • Antonin Pottier & Rabia Nessah, 2014. "Berge–Vaisman And Nash Equilibria: Transformation Of Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 16(04), pages 1-8.
      • Antonin Pottier & Rabia Nessah, 2014. "Berge–Vaisman And Nash Equilibria: Transformation Of Games," Post-Print hal-01083736, HAL.
   5. Schouten, Jop & Borm, Peter & Hendrickx, Ruud, 2018. "Unilateral Support Equilibria," Discussion Paper 2018-011, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

8. Tarik Tazdaït & Rabia Nessah & Moussa Larbani, 2007. "New Sufficient Conditions for the g-maximumInequality," CIRED Working Papers halshs-00271214, HAL.
   • R. Nessah & M. Larbani & T. Tazdaït, 2009. "New sufficient conditions for the g-maximum inequality," Post-Print hal-00833750, HAL.
   • R. Nessah & M. Larbani, 2007. "New Sufficient Conditions for the g-maximum Inequality," Post-Print hal-00257307, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. Courtois, Pierre & Nessah, Rabia & Tazdaït, Tarik, 2017. "Existence and computation of Berge equilibrium and of two refinements," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 7-15.

9. Alejandro Caparrós & Abdelhakim Hammoudi & Tarik Tazdaït, 2004. "On Coalition Formation with Heterogeneous Agents," Working Papers 2004.70, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
   • Caparros A. & Giraud-Heraud E. & Hammoudi A. & Tazdaït T., 2006. "On Coalition Formation with Heterogeneous Agents," Working Papers ERMES 0612, ERMES, University Paris 2.

   Cited by:

   1. Christoph Jeßberger, 2011. "Multilateral Environmental Agreements up to 2050: Are They Sustainable Enough?," ifo Working Paper Series 98, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.

10. P. Courtois & J.-C. Pércau & T. Tazdaït, 2004. "Une approche évolutionnaire des négociations internationales en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux," Post-Print hal-00719284, HAL.
    • Pierre Courtois & Jean-Christophe Péreau & Tarik Tazdaït, 2004. "Une approche évolutionnaire des négociations internationales en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 70(1), pages 31-51.
    • Pierre COURTOIS & Jean-Christophe PEREAU & Tarik TAZDAIT, 2004. "Une approche évolutionnaire des négociations internationales en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2004012, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).

    Cited by:

    1. Marius Ochea & Aart Zeeuw, 2015. "Evolution of Reciprocity in Asymmetric International Environmental Negotiations," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 837-854, December.

11. Alejandro Caparrós & Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdaït, 2003. "North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2003.09, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • A. Caparrós & J.-C. Péreau & T. Tazdaït, 2004. "North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 455-480, February.
    • Alexandro Caparros & Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdait, 2004. "North-South Climate Change Negotiations:a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information," Post-Print halshs-00009823, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Hans-Peter Weikard & Leo Wangler & Andreas Freytag, 2009. "Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries," Jena Economic Research Papers 2009-077, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
       • Hans-Peter Weikard & Leo Wangler & Andreas Freytag, 2015. "Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 711-727, December.
    2. PEREAU Jean-Christophe & CAPARROS Alejandro, 2015. "Multilateral versus sequential negotiations over climate change," Cahiers du GREThA 2015-34, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée.
       • Alejandro Caparrós & Jean-Christophe Péreau, 2015. "Multilateral versus sequential negotiations over climate change," Working Papers 1509, Instituto de Políticas y Bienes Públicos (IPP), CSIC.
       • Alejandro Caparrós & Jean-Christophe Péreau, 2017. "Multilateral versus sequential negotiations over climate change," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 365-387.
    3. Leo Wangler & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2013. "The political economy of international environmental agreements: a survey," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 387-403, September.
       • Leo Wangler & JJuan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2011. "The Political Economy of International Environmental Agreements: A Survey," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-038, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    4. Pierre Courtois & Tarik Tazdaït, 2014. "Bargaining over a climate deal: deadline and delay," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 220(1), pages 205-221, September.
       • P. Courtois & T. Tazdaït, 2011. "Bargaining over a climate deal: deadline and delay," Post-Print hal-00716719, HAL.
       • Courtois Pierre & Tarik Tazdaït, 2014. "Bargaining over a climate deal: deadline and delay," Post-Print halshs-01084942, HAL.
    5. Kai A. Konrad & Marcel Thum, 2014. "Does a Clean Development Mechanism Facilitate International Environmental Agreements?," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2014-20, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
       • Kai A. Konrad & Marcel Thum, 2018. "Does a Clean Development Mechanism Facilitate International Environmental Agreements?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 69(4), pages 837-851, April.
       • Thum, Marcel P. & Konrad, Kai, 2015. "Does a Clean Development Mechanism Facilitate International Environmental Agreements?," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113174, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    6. Michael Finus & Dirk Rübbelke, 2013. "Public Good Provision and Ancillary Benefits: The Case of Climate Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(2), pages 211-226, October.
    7. Aurélie Slechten, 2015. "Environmental agreements under asymmetric information," Working Papers 95042257, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    8. Jon Hovi & Hugh Ward & Frank Grundig, 2015. "Hope or Despair? Formal Models of Climate Cooperation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 665-688, December.
    9. Margrethe Aanesen, 2012. "Sequential bargaining, external effects of agreement, and public intervention," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 105(2), pages 145-160, March.
    10. Carsten Helm & Franz Wirl, 2011. "International Environmental Agreements: Incentive Contracts with Multilateral Externalities," Working Papers V-336-11, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2011.
    11. Hans-Peter Weikard & Rob Dellink & Ekko Ierland, 2010. "Renegotiations in the Greenhouse," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 45(4), pages 573-596, April.
    12. Pierre Courtois & Guillaume Haeringer, 2012. "Environmental cooperation: ratifying second-best agreements," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 565-584, June.
    13. Basak Bayramoglu & Jean-François Jacques, 2015. "International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Costly Monetary Transfers," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 745-767, December.

12. Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdait, 2001. "Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment inthe Presence of Global EnvironmentalProblems," Post-Print halshs-00009889, HAL.
    • Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdait, 2001. "Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment in the Presence of Global Environmental Problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 20(3), pages 225-239, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Alejandro Caparrós & Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdaït, 2003. "North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2003.09, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
       • A. Caparrós & J.-C. Péreau & T. Tazdaït, 2004. "North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 455-480, February.
       • Alexandro Caparros & Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdait, 2004. "North-South Climate Change Negotiations:a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information," Post-Print halshs-00009823, HAL.
    2. Gilles Rotillon & Tazdaït Tarik, 2003. "Coopération internationale et problèmes environnementaux globaux : vision normative versus vision positive," Revue d’économie du développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 11(1), pages 101-134.
    3. Luisito Bertinelli & Amer Tabakovic & Luca Marchiori & Benteng Zou, 2015. "Transboundary Pollution Abatement: The Impact of Unilateral Commitment in Differential Games," CREA Discussion Paper Series 15-02, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
    4. Katarina Elofsson, 2007. "Cost Uncertainty and Unilateral Abatement," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 36(2), pages 143-162, February.
    5. Urs Steiner Brandt, 2003. "Unilateral Actions the Case of International Environmental Problems," Working Papers 40/03, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
       • Brandt, Urs Steiner, 2004. "Unilateral actions, the case of international environmental problems," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 373-391, December.
    6. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Shyama Ramani, 2006. "Les externalités sociales permettent-elles de résoudre la controverse théorique des « petites coalitions stables » dans les accords environnementaux ?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(3), pages 431-438.
    7. Cristina Grazia & François Gusdorf & Abdelhakim Hammoudi, 2014. "Climate Change, Heterogeneities, and Stability of International Fiscal Harmonization," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 58(4), pages 579-603, August.

13. Sylvain Zeghni & Gilles Rotillon & Tarik Tazdait, 1996. "Bilateral or multilateral bargaining in the face of global environmental change?," Post-Print hal-01100892, HAL.
    • Rotillon, Gilles & Tazdait, Tarik & Zeghni, Sylvain, 1996. "Bilateral or multilateral bargaining in the face of global environmental change?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 177-187, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdait, 2001. "Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment inthe Presence of Global EnvironmentalProblems," Post-Print halshs-00009889, HAL.
       • Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdait, 2001. "Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment in the Presence of Global Environmental Problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 20(3), pages 225-239, November.
    2. Mélanie Heugues, 2009. "International Environmental Cooperation: A New Eye on the Greenhouse Gases Emissions’ Control," Working Papers 09-04, LAMETA, Universitiy of Montpellier, revised Mar 2009.
       • Mélanie Heugues, 2014. "International environmental cooperation: a new eye on the greenhouse gas emissions’ control," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 220(1), pages 239-262, September.
    3. Alejandro Caparrós & Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdaït, 2003. "North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2003.09, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
       • A. Caparrós & J.-C. Péreau & T. Tazdaït, 2004. "North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 455-480, February.
       • Alexandro Caparros & Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdait, 2004. "North-South Climate Change Negotiations:a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information," Post-Print halshs-00009823, HAL.
    4. Pierre Courtois & Tarik Tazdaït, 2014. "Bargaining over a climate deal: deadline and delay," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 220(1), pages 205-221, September.
       • P. Courtois & T. Tazdaït, 2011. "Bargaining over a climate deal: deadline and delay," Post-Print hal-00716719, HAL.
       • Courtois Pierre & Tarik Tazdaït, 2014. "Bargaining over a climate deal: deadline and delay," Post-Print halshs-01084942, HAL.
    5. Alejandro Caparrós, 2016. "Bargaining and International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 5-31, September.
    6. Costanza, Robert, 1997. "Editorial : Just rewards: Herman Daly, the Heineken Environmental Prize, and the Ecological Economics best article award," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-4, July.
    7. Gilles Rotillon & Tazdaït Tarik, 2003. "Coopération internationale et problèmes environnementaux globaux : vision normative versus vision positive," Revue d’économie du développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 11(1), pages 101-134.
    8. María del Carmen García-Alonso & Keith Hartley, 1999. "Export Controls, Market Structure and International Coordination," Studies in Economics 9908, School of Economics, University of Kent.
       • Maria del Carmen Garcia-Alonso & Keith Hartley, 2000. "Export controls, market structure and international coordination," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 481-503.
    9. Rieple, Alison & Singh, Rajbir, 2010. "A value chain analysis of the organic cotton industry: The case of UK retailers and Indian suppliers," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(11), pages 2292-2302, September.
    10. P. Courtois & J.-C. Pércau & T. Tazdaït, 2004. "Une approche évolutionnaire des négociations internationales en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux," Post-Print hal-00719284, HAL.
        • Pierre Courtois & Jean-Christophe Péreau & Tarik Tazdaït, 2004. "Une approche évolutionnaire des négociations internationales en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 70(1), pages 31-51.
        • Pierre COURTOIS & Jean-Christophe PEREAU & Tarik TAZDAIT, 2004. "Une approche évolutionnaire des négociations internationales en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2004012, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).

Articles

1. Courtois, Pierre & Nessah, Rabia & Tazdaït, Tarik, 2017. "Existence and computation of Berge equilibrium and of two refinements," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 7-15.

   Cited by:

   1. Schouten, Jop & Borm, Peter & Hendrickx, Ruud, 2018. "Unilateral Support Equilibria," Discussion Paper 2018-011, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

2. Antoine Pietri & Tarik Tazdaït & Mehrdad Vahabi, 2017. "The Economics of Empire-Building: Predatory and Price Competitions," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 173(2), pages 253-278, June.

   Cited by:

   1. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2016. "A positive theory of the predatory state," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(3), pages 153-175, September.
   2. Antoine Pietri, 2017. "Les modèles de « rivalité coercitive » dans l’analyse économique des conflits," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(3), pages 307-352.

3. Courtois, Pierre & Nessah, Rabia & Tazdaït, Tarik, 2015. "How To Play Games? Nash Versus Berge Behaviour Rules," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(01), pages 123-139, March.
   • Pierre Courtois & Rabia Nessah & Tarik Tazdaït, 2012. "How to Play Games? Nash versus Berge Behavior Rules," Post-Print hal-00797260, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. Courtois, Pierre & Nessah, Rabia & Tazdaït, Tarik, 2017. "Existence and computation of Berge equilibrium and of two refinements," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 7-15.
   2. Bertrand Crettez, 2017. "A New Sufficient Condition for a Berge Equilibrium to be a Berge–Vaisman Equilibrium," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), vol. 15(3), pages 451-459, September.
   3. Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "What does “we” want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 128(3), pages 311-332.
      • Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "What does “we” want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours," Post-Print halshs-01858190, HAL.
      • Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "What Does 'We' Want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours," Working Papers halshs-01837218, HAL.
      • Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "What Does 'We' Want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours," GREDEG Working Papers 2018-17, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.
   4. Bertrand Crettez, 2017. "On Sugden’s “mutually beneficial practice” and Berge equilibrium," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 64(4), pages 357-366, December.
   5. Bertrand Crettez, 2017. "On Hobbes’s state of nature and game theory," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(4), pages 499-511, December.
   6. Schouten, Jop & Borm, Peter & Hendrickx, Ruud, 2018. "Unilateral Support Equilibria," Discussion Paper 2018-011, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

4. Pierre Courtois & Tarik Tazdaït, 2014. "Bargaining over a climate deal: deadline and delay," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 220(1), pages 205-221, September.
   • P. Courtois & T. Tazdaït, 2011. "Bargaining over a climate deal: deadline and delay," Post-Print hal-00716719, HAL.
   • Courtois Pierre & Tarik Tazdaït, 2014. "Bargaining over a climate deal: deadline and delay," Post-Print halshs-01084942, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. Alejandro Caparrós, 2016. "Bargaining and International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 5-31, September.
   2. Kai A. Konrad & Marcel Thum, 2014. "Does a Clean Development Mechanism Facilitate International Environmental Agreements?," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2014-20, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
      • Kai A. Konrad & Marcel Thum, 2018. "Does a Clean Development Mechanism Facilitate International Environmental Agreements?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 69(4), pages 837-851, April.
      • Thum, Marcel P. & Konrad, Kai, 2015. "Does a Clean Development Mechanism Facilitate International Environmental Agreements?," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113174, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
   3. S. Yu & E. C. Ierland & H.-P. Weikard & X. Zhu, 2017. "Nash bargaining solutions for international climate agreements under different sets of bargaining weights," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(5), pages 709-729, October.
   4. Basak Bayramoglu & Jean-François Jacques, 2015. "International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Costly Monetary Transfers," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 745-767, December.

5. Nessah, Rabia & Tazdaı¨t, Tarik, 2013. "Absolute optimal solution for a compact and convex game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 224(2), pages 353-361.
   • Rabia Nessah & Tarik Tazdaït, 2013. "Absolute optimal solution for a compact and convex game," Post-Print hal-00785033, HAL.
   • Rabia Nessah, 2010. "Absolute Optimal Solution For a Compact and Convex Game," Working Papers 2010-ECO-07, IESEG School of Management.

   Cited by:

   1. Courtois, Pierre & Nessah, Rabia & Tazdaït, Tarik, 2017. "Existence and computation of Berge equilibrium and of two refinements," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 7-15.
   2. Zhao, Jingang, 2018. "Three little-known and yet still significant contributions of Lloyd Shapley," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 592-599.

6. Caparrós, Alejandro & Péreau, Jean-Christophe & Tazdaït, Tarik, 2013. "Emission trading and international competition: The impact of labor market rigidity on technology adoption and output," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 36-43.

   Cited by:

   1. Chang, Kai & Zhang, Chao & Chang, Hao, 2016. "Emissions reduction allocation and economic welfare estimation through interregional emissions trading in China: Evidence from efficiency and equity," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 1125-1135.

7. Olivier Musy & Antonin Pottier & Tarik Tazdait, 2012. "A New Theorem To Find Berge Equilibria," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 14(01), pages 1-10.
   • Olivier Musy & Antonin Pottier & Tarik Tazdaït, 2012. "A New Theorem to Find Berge Equilibria," Post-Print hal-01385826, HAL.
   See citations under working paper version above.
8. Pierre Courtois & Tarik Tazdaït, 2012. "Learning to trust strangers: an evolutionary perspective," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 367-383, April.
   • Pierre Courtois & Tarik Tazdaït, 2011. "Learning to trust strangers: an evolutionary perspective," Working Papers 11-06, LAMETA, Universitiy of Montpellier, revised Feb 2011.
   • Pierre Courtois & Tarik Tazdaït, 2012. "Learning to trust strangers: an evolutionary perspective," Post-Print hal-00715459, HAL.
   See citations under working paper version above.
9. Alejandro Caparrós & Eric Giraud-Héraud & Abdelhakim Hammoudi & Tarik Tazdaït, 2011. "Coalition Stability with Heterogeneous Agents," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(1), pages 286-296.
   • A. Caparrós & E. Giraud-Héraud & A. Hammoudi & T. Tazdaït, 2011. "Coalition stability with heterogeneous agents," Post-Print hal-00716327, HAL.
   See citations under working paper version above.
10. Pierre Courtois & Tarik Tazdaït, 2008. "Accord climatique. Concessions et ratifications," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 59(4), pages 719-735.

    Cited by:

    1. Alejandro Caparrós, 2016. "Bargaining and International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 5-31, September.

11. Martinez, Emmanuel & Tazdaït, Tarik & Tovar, Elisabeth, 2008. "Participative democracy and local environmental issues," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1-2), pages 68-79, December.

    Cited by:

    1. García Callejas, Danny, 2010. "Democracy and Environmental Quality in Latin America: A Panel System of Equations Approach, 1995-2008," Borradores Departamento de Economía 008102, Universidad de Antioquia - CIE.
    2. Danny García Callejas, 2015. "Voting for the environment: the importance of Democracy and education in Latin America," Revista de Economía del Caribe 014782, Universidad del Norte.

12. Courtois, Pierre & Tazdaït, Tarik, 2007. "Games of influence in climate change negotiations: Modelling interactions," Ecological Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 204(3), pages 301-314.
    • P. Courtois & T. Tazdaït, 2007. "Games of influence in climate change negotiations: Modelling interactions," Post-Print hal-00716398, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. T. BALINT & F. LAMPERTI & A. Mandel & A. Roventini Author-Workplace-Name : OFCE-Sciences Pp and SKEMA Businees School & A. Sapio Author-Workplace-Name : Parathenope Universtiy of Naples, 2016. "Complexity and the Economics of Climate Change : a survey and look forward," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2016-23, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
       • Tomas Balint & Francesco Lamperti & Antoine Mandel & Mauro Napoletano & Andrea Roventini & Alessandro Sapio, 2016. "Complexity and the Economics of Climate Change: a Survey and a Look Forward," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 16058, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
       • Tomas Balint & Francesco Lamperti & Antoine Mandel & Mauro Napoletano & Andrea Roventini & Alessandro Sapio, 2016. "Complexity and the Economics of Climate Change: a Survey and a Look Forward," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01390694, HAL.
       • Tomas Balint & Francesco Lamperti & Mauro Napoletano & Antoine Mandel & Andrea Roventini & Sandro Sapio, 2016. "Complexity and the Economics of Climate Change: a Survey and a Look Forward," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/5qr7f0k4sk8, Sciences Po.
       • Balint, T. & Lamperti, F. & Mandel, A. & Napoletano, M. & Roventini, A. & Sapio, A., 2017. "Complexity and the Economics of Climate Change: A Survey and a Look Forward," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 252-265.
       • Tomas Balint & Francesco Lamperti & Antoine Mandel & Mauro Napoletano & Andrea Roventini & Alessandro Sapio, 2016. "Complexity and the Economics of Climate Change: a Survey and a Look Forward," LEM Papers Series 2016/29, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
       • T. Balint & F. Lamperti & A. Mandel & M. Napoletano & A. Roventini & A. Sapio, 2017. "Complexity and the Economics of Climate Change: A Survey and a Look Forward," Post-Print halshs-01906003, HAL.
    2. He, Shawei & Marc Kilgour, D. & Hipel, Keith W., 2017. "A general hierarchical graph model for conflict resolution with application to greenhouse gas emission disputes between USA and China," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 257(3), pages 919-932.
    3. Hourcade, Jean-Charles & Salles, Jean-Michel & Thery, Daniel, 1992. "Ecological economics and scientific controversies. Lessons from some recent policy making in the EEC," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 211-233, December.
    4. Jing Wu & Jean-Claude Thill, 2018. "Climate change coalition formation and equilibrium strategies in mitigation games in the post-Kyoto Era," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 573-598, August.
    5. Tomas Balint & Francesco Lamperti & Antoine Mandel & Mauro Napoletano & Andrea Roventini & Sandro Sapio, 2017. "Complexity and the economics of climate change : a survey and a look foreward," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/1nlv566svi8, Sciences Po.
       • Tomas Balint & Francesco Lamperti & Antoine Mandel & Mauro Napoletano & Andrea Roventini & Alessandro Sapio, 2016. "Complexity and the Economics of Climate Change: a Survey and a Look Forward," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 16058, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
       • Tomas Balint & Francesco Lamperti & Antoine Mandel & Mauro Napoletano & Andrea Roventini & Alessandro Sapio, 2016. "Complexity and the Economics of Climate Change: a Survey and a Look Forward," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01390694, HAL.
       • Tomas Balint & Francesco Lamperti & Mauro Napoletano & Antoine Mandel & Andrea Roventini & Sandro Sapio, 2016. "Complexity and the Economics of Climate Change: a Survey and a Look Forward," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/5qr7f0k4sk8, Sciences Po.
       • Balint, T. & Lamperti, F. & Mandel, A. & Napoletano, M. & Roventini, A. & Sapio, A., 2017. "Complexity and the Economics of Climate Change: A Survey and a Look Forward," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 252-265.
       • Tomas Balint & Francesco Lamperti & Antoine Mandel & Mauro Napoletano & Andrea Roventini & Alessandro Sapio, 2016. "Complexity and the Economics of Climate Change: a Survey and a Look Forward," LEM Papers Series 2016/29, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
       • T. Balint & F. Lamperti & A. Mandel & M. Napoletano & A. Roventini & A. Sapio, 2017. "Complexity and the Economics of Climate Change: A Survey and a Look Forward," Post-Print halshs-01906003, HAL.

13. A. Caparrós & J.-C. Péreau & T. Tazdaït, 2004. "North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 455-480, February.
    • Alejandro Caparrós & Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdaït, 2003. "North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2003.09, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • Alexandro Caparros & Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdait, 2004. "North-South Climate Change Negotiations:a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information," Post-Print halshs-00009823, HAL.
    See citations under working paper version above.
14. Pierre Courtois & Jean-Christophe Péreau & Tarik Tazdaït, 2004. "Une approche évolutionnaire des négociations internationales en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 70(1), pages 31-51.
    • Pierre COURTOIS & Jean-Christophe PEREAU & Tarik TAZDAIT, 2004. "Une approche évolutionnaire des négociations internationales en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2004012, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    • P. Courtois & J.-C. Pércau & T. Tazdaït, 2004. "Une approche évolutionnaire des négociations internationales en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux," Post-Print hal-00719284, HAL.
    See citations under working paper version above.
15. Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdait, 2001. "Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment in the Presence of Global Environmental Problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 20(3), pages 225-239, November.
    • Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdait, 2001. "Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment inthe Presence of Global EnvironmentalProblems," Post-Print halshs-00009889, HAL.
    See citations under working paper version above.
16. Gilles Rotillon & Tarik Tazdaït, 1996. "International bargaining in the presence of global environmental change," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(3), pages 293-314, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdait, 2001. "Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment inthe Presence of Global EnvironmentalProblems," Post-Print halshs-00009889, HAL.
       • Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdait, 2001. "Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment in the Presence of Global Environmental Problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 20(3), pages 225-239, November.
    2. Pittel, Karen & Rübbelke, Dirk T. G., 2005. "Internationale Klimaschutzverhandlungen und sekundäre Nutzen der Klimapolitik," Munich Reprints in Economics 19353, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
       • Karen Pittel & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2005. "Internationale Klimaschutzverhandlungen und sekundäre Nutzen der Klimapolitik," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 6(3), pages 369-383, August.
    3. Rotillon, Gilles & Tazdait, Tarik & Zeghni, Sylvain, 1996. "Bilateral or multilateral bargaining in the face of global environmental change?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 177-187, August.
       • Sylvain Zeghni & Gilles Rotillon & Tarik Tazdait, 1996. "Bilateral or multilateral bargaining in the face of global environmental change?," Post-Print hal-01100892, HAL.
    4. Alejandro Caparrós, 2016. "Bargaining and International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 5-31, September.
    5. Gilles Rotillon & Tazdaït Tarik, 2003. "Coopération internationale et problèmes environnementaux globaux : vision normative versus vision positive," Revue d’économie du développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 11(1), pages 101-134.
    6. Dapeng Cai & Jie Li, 2018. "North–South Negotiations on Emission Reductions: A Bargaining Approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 71(1), pages 157-177, September.
    7. Rieple, Alison & Singh, Rajbir, 2010. "A value chain analysis of the organic cotton industry: The case of UK retailers and Indian suppliers," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(11), pages 2292-2302, September.
    8. Rubbelke, Dirk T.G., 2006. "Climate policy in developing countries and conditional transfers," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(13), pages 1600-1610, September.
    9. P. Courtois & J.-C. Pércau & T. Tazdaït, 2004. "Une approche évolutionnaire des négociations internationales en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux," Post-Print hal-00719284, HAL.
       • Pierre Courtois & Jean-Christophe Péreau & Tarik Tazdaït, 2004. "Une approche évolutionnaire des négociations internationales en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 70(1), pages 31-51.
       • Pierre COURTOIS & Jean-Christophe PEREAU & Tarik TAZDAIT, 2004. "Une approche évolutionnaire des négociations internationales en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2004012, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    10. Sotelsek, Daniel F. & Azqueta Oyarzún, Diego, 1999. "Comparative advantages and the exploitation of environmental resources," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), August.
    11. Holladay, J. Scott & Livermore, Michael A., 2013. "Regional variation, holdouts, and climate treaty negotiations," Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(02), pages 131-157, August.
        • Holladay J. Scott & Livermore Michael A., 2013. "Regional variation, holdouts, and climate treaty negotiations," Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 131-157, August.
    12. Karen Pittel & Dirk Rübbelke, 2012. "Transitions in the negotiations on climate change: from prisoner’s dilemma to chicken and beyond," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 23-39, March.

17. Rotillon, Gilles & Tazdait, Tarik & Zeghni, Sylvain, 1996. "Bilateral or multilateral bargaining in the face of global environmental change?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 177-187, August.
    • Sylvain Zeghni & Gilles Rotillon & Tarik Tazdait, 1996. "Bilateral or multilateral bargaining in the face of global environmental change?," Post-Print hal-01100892, HAL.
    See citations under working paper version above.
18. Gilles Rotillon & Tarik Tazdaït & Sylvain Zeghni & Claude Jessua, 1996. "Engagement unilatéral spontané en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 47(3), pages 601-610.

    Cited by:

    1. Gilles Rotillon & Tazdaït Tarik, 2003. "Coopération internationale et problèmes environnementaux globaux : vision normative versus vision positive," Revue d’économie du développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 11(1), pages 101-134.

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Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 8 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.

1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (4) 2005-12-09 2006-04-08 2011-05-07 2011-05-07
2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (4) 2004-07-18 2004-09-12 2011-05-07 2013-07-20
3. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (3) 2013-03-16 2013-07-20 2015-04-11
4. NEP-ENV: Environmental Economics (3) 2006-04-08 2006-04-22 2011-05-07
5. NEP-ENE: Energy Economics (2) 2006-04-22 2011-05-07
6. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (2) 2011-05-07 2011-05-07
7. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (2) 2013-03-16 2013-07-20
8. NEP-CBE: Cognitive & Behavioural Economics (1) 2011-05-07
9. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2004-07-18
10. NEP-CIS: Confederation of Independent States (1) 2013-07-20
11. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (1) 2011-05-07
12. NEP-HIS: Business, Economic & Financial History (1) 2013-07-20
13. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (1) 2011-05-07
14. NEP-SOC: Social Norms & Social Capital (1) 2011-05-07

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