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Bargaining with Non-Monolithic Players

Author

Listed:
  • Jean Christophe Pereau

    (Université de Marne-la-Vallée)

  • Alejandro Caparrós

    (Spanish Council for Scientific Research (CSIC) and Institute of Economics and Geography (IEG))

  • Tarik Tazdaït

    (C.N.R.S - E.H.E.S.S - CIRED)

Abstract

This paper analyses strategic bargaining in negotiations between non-monolithic players, i.e. agents starting negotiations can split up in smaller entities during the bargaining process. We show that the possibility of scission in the informed coalition implies that it loses its information advantages. We also show that when the possibility of a scission exists the uninformed player does not focus on his or her beliefs about the strength of the informed coalition but on the proportion of weak/strong players within this coalition. Finally, our results show that the possibility of a scission reduces the incentives for the leader to propose a high offer to ensure a global agreement. We apply this framework to international negotiations on global public goods and to wage negotiations.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean Christophe Pereau & Alejandro Caparrós & Tarik Tazdaït, 2005. "Bargaining with Non-Monolithic Players," Working Papers 2005.95, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.95
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategic bargaining; Non-monolithic players; Scission; Noncooperative game-theory;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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