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Coase Goes to War: Contract Choice on the Battlefield

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  • Ennio Piano

Abstract

Economic approaches to conflict tend to focus on its determinants, on the factors influencing its outcome, and on its consequence to the distribution of resources. Relatively little attention is paid to the ways these parties structure the internal organization of their efforts during conflict. This paper builds on the theory of contract choice to develop a framework for the analysis of military groups. This framework produces predictions on the systematic variation of military organization under different technological and environmental circumstances. These predictions are tested against historical evidence on a variety of historical case studies. Classification JEL: D23; D74; N40

Suggested Citation

  • Ennio Piano, 2020. "Coase Goes to War: Contract Choice on the Battlefield," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(6), pages 1001-1023.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_306_0159
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conflict economics; Contract choice; Military organization; Property rights;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative

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