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Ethnogenesis and statelessness

Author

Listed:
  • Vincent Geloso

    (George Mason University)

  • Louis Rouanet

    (Western Kentucky University)

Abstract

The process of ethnogenesis (i.e., the formation of new ethnic groups) is here considered equivalent to the production of “governance goods” in situations where the state is weak or absent. In these cases, the process of ethnogenesis is a response to (1) the problem of social distance between heterogeneous groups which functions as a barrier to trade, and (2) the problem of providing public goods. As an investment in governance, ethnogenesis reduces the costs of trading and cooperating, and expands the scope for specialization. We rely on two examples of peaceful and productive relations between First Nations and European settlers in Canada between the early seventeenth and mid-nineteenth centuries to support our hypothesis. The emergence of “hybrid” cultural groups and identities fostered peaceful relations and facilitated trade in borderland areas in which state rule was virtually nonexistent. It also permitted these new groups to provide key collective goods within their own communities. This, in turn, facilitated international trade (especially in furs). Both of our examples suggest that cultural processes can be endogenous responses aimed at the production of governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Vincent Geloso & Louis Rouanet, 2023. "Ethnogenesis and statelessness," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 377-407, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:55:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s10657-023-09767-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-023-09767-8
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ethnogenesis; Weak states; State capacity; Self-governance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • N11 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913

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