The perils of government enforcement
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0319-6
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- Romaniuc, Rustam & Farrow, Katherine & Ibanez, Lisette & Marciano Alain, 2016. "The Perils of Government Enforcement," IEL Working Papers 21, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
- Rustam Romaniuc & Katherine Farrow & Lisette Ibanez & Alain Marciano, 2016. "The Perils of Government Enforcement," Post-Print hal-01643239, HAL.
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Cited by:
- Shaun Larcom & Luca A. Panzone & Timothy Swanson, 2017. "Follow-the-leader? Measuring the internalisation of law," CIES Research Paper series 50-2017, Centre for International Environmental Studies, The Graduate Institute.
More about this item
Keywords
Self-governance; Private enforcement; Peer control; Government enforcement; Public goods;JEL classification:
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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