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The calculus of piratical consent: the myth of the myth of social contract

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  • Peter Leeson

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  • Peter Leeson, 2009. "The calculus of piratical consent: the myth of the myth of social contract," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 443-459, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:139:y:2009:i:3:p:443-459
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9403-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson, 1998. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," International Economic Association Series, in: Silvio Borner & Martin Paldam (ed.), The Political Dimension of Economic Growth, chapter 3, pages 38-73, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. Peter J. Boettke (ed.), 1994. "The Elgar Companion to Austrian Economics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 53.
    3. Sass, Tim R, 1992. "Constitutional Choice in Representative Democracies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(4), pages 405-424, December.
    4. Murray N. Rothbard, 1997. "The Logic of Action Two," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1223.
    5. Heckathorn, Douglas D & Maser, Steven M, 1987. "Bargaining and the," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 69-98, Spring.
    6. Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 1049-1094, December.
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