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Gang rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance

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  • Christopher Blattman
  • Gustavo Duncan
  • Benjamin Lessing
  • Santiago Tobón

Abstract

Criminal groups govern millions worldwide. Even in strong states, gangs resolve disputes and provide security. Why do these duopolies of coercion emerge? In many cases, gangs fill vacuums of official order. If so, increasing state presence should crowd out criminal governance. In this paper, however, we show that state and gang rule are sometimes complements. In particular, gangs can deter state predation by keeping neighborhoods orderly and loyal. If true, increasing state presence could increase gang rule. We investigate in Medellín, Colombia. Criminal leaders told us they rule mainly to protect drug rents. We test gang responses to state presence using a geographic discontinuity. Internal border changes in 1987 assigned some blocks to be exogenously closer to state security for three decades. Gangs responded to closer state presence by increasing governance services, but primarily in neighborhoods with the greatest potential drug rents. This suggests new strategies for countering criminal governance.

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  • Christopher Blattman & Gustavo Duncan & Benjamin Lessing & Santiago Tobón, 2021. "Gang rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance," NBER Working Papers 28458, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28458
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    2. Martin, Diego A. & Romero, Dario A., 2024. "Social distancing and COVID-19 under violence: Evidence from Colombia," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).
    3. Jenny Pearce & Alexandra Abello Colak, 2021. "Humanizing Security through Action‐oriented Research in Latin America," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 52(6), pages 1370-1395, November.
    4. Abril, Veronica & Perez-Vincent, Santiago & Tobon, Santiago & Vanegas-Arias, Martin, 2022. "How to measure public trust in the police? A framework with an application for Colombia," SocArXiv 89shw, Center for Open Science.
    5. Escobar, Maria A. & Tobón, Santiago & Vanegas-Arias, Martín, 2023. "Production and persistence of criminal skills: Evidence from a high-crime context," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    6. Herrera, Joel Salvador & Martinez-Alvarez, Cesar B., 2022. "Diversifying violence: Mining, export-agriculture, and criminal governance in Mexico," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    7. Vijayendra Rao, 2023. "Can Economics Become More Reflexive? Exploring the Potential of Mixed Methods," Springer Books, in: Ashwini Deshpande (ed.), Handbook on Economics of Discrimination and Affirmative Action, chapter 14, pages 323-349, Springer.
    8. Raphael Bruce & Alexsandros Cavgias & Luis Meloni, 2022. "Policy Enforcement in the Presence of Organized Crime: Evidence from Rio de Janeiro," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2022_22, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
    9. Arellano-Bover, Jaime & De Simoni, Marco & Guiso, Luigi & Macchiavello, Rocco & Marchetti, Domenico J. & Prem, Mounu, 2024. "Mafias and Firms," SocArXiv sr6ep, Center for Open Science.
    10. Santiago Gómez & Daniel Mejía & Santiago Tobón, 2021. "The Deterrent Effect Of Surveillance Cameras On Crime," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 40(2), pages 553-571, March.
    11. Blattman, Christopher & Duncan, Gustavo & Lessing, Benjamin & Tobon, Santiago, 2022. "State-building on the Margin: An Urban Experiment in Medellín," SocArXiv 3bncz, Center for Open Science.
    12. Bonilla-Mejía, Leonardo & Londoño-Ortega, Erika & Henao, María Fernanda, 2024. "Geographic isolation and learning: Evidence from rural schools in Colombia," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    13. Miller, Ben & Rettberg, Angelika, 2023. "“Todos Pagan”: Las PYME y la violencia urbana en Medellín, Colombia," Documentos CEDE 20999, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    14. Santiago Tobón Zapata & Maria Antonia Escobar Bernal & Martin Vanegas Arias, 2021. "Criminal capital persistence: Evidence from 90,000 inmates’ releases," Documentos de Trabajo de Valor Público 19297, Universidad EAFIT.
    15. Trudeau, Jessie, 2022. "Limiting aggressive policing can reduce police and civilian violence," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    16. Anna-Katharina Lenz & Martin Valdivia, 2023. "Nudging microentrepreneurs under fire: Experimental evidence from favelas in Rio de Janeiro," Working Papers 194, Peruvian Economic Association.
    17. Cavgias, Alexsandros & Bruce, Raphael & Meloni, Luis, 2023. "Policy enforcement in the presence of organized crime: Evidence from Rio de Janeiro," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • E26 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Informal Economy; Underground Economy
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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