IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/restud/v92y2025i3p1497-1531..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Gang Rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance

Author

Listed:
  • Christopher Blattman
  • Gustavo Duncan
  • Benjamin Lessing
  • Santiago Tobón

Abstract

Criminal groups govern millions worldwide. Even in strong states, gangs resolve disputes and provide security. Why do these duopolies of coercion emerge? Often, gangs fill vacuums of official power, suggesting that increasing state presence should crowd out criminal governance. We show, however, that state and gang rule can be strategic complements. In particular, gangs could minimize seizures and arrests by keeping neighbourhoods orderly and loyal. If true, increasing state presence could increase incentives for gang rule. In Medellín, Colombia, criminal leaders told us they rule to protect drug rents from police. We test gang responses to state presence using a geographic discontinuity. Internal border changes in 1987 assigned blocks to be closer or further from state security for three decades. Gangs exogenously closer to state presence developed more governance over time. They primarily did so in neighbourhoods with the greatest potential drug rents. This suggests new strategies for countering criminal governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher Blattman & Gustavo Duncan & Benjamin Lessing & Santiago Tobón, 2025. "Gang Rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 92(3), pages 1497-1531.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:92:y:2025:i:3:p:1497-1531.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdae079
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:92:y:2025:i:3:p:1497-1531.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/restud .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.