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Conditional Cash Transfers, Civil Conflict and Insurgent Influence: Experimental Evidence from the Philippines

  • Benjamin Crost

    ()

    (University of Colorado Denver)

  • Joseph H. Felter

    ()

    (Stanford University)

  • Patrick B. Johnston

    (RAND Corporation)

Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs are an increasingly popular tool for reducing poverty in conflict-affected areas. Despite their growing popularity, there is limited evidence on how CCT programs affect conflict and theoretical predictions are ambiguous. We estimate the effect of conditional cash transfers on civil conflict in the Philippines by exploiting an experiment that randomly assigned eligibility for a CCT program at the village level. We find that cash transfers caused a substantial decrease in conflict-related incidents in treatment villages relative to control villages. Using unique data on local insurgent influence, we also find that the program significantly reduced insurgent influence in treated villages.

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File URL: http://www.hicn.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/HiCN-WP-174.pdf
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Paper provided by Households in Conflict Network in its series HiCN Working Papers with number 174.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2014
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hic:wpaper:174
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.hicn.org

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