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Persistent Fighting and Shifting Power

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  • Robert Powell

Abstract

Three striking features about both interstate and civil war are (1) there are often periods of persistent fighting, (2) fighting commonly ends in negotiated settlements as well as in militarily decisive outcomes, and (3) fighting sometimes recurs. This article links these features to shifts in the distribution of power and to the fact that one of the functions of fighting is to forestall adverse shifts. The analysis centers on a simple model of state consolidation. The equilibrium displays these features: Fighting occurs when the distribution of power is shifting rapidly. The factions avoid fighting and cut deals when the distribution of power shifts slowly or is stable. Fighting resumes if the distribution of power again begins to shift rapidly. The analysis also shows that state consolidation can occur without fighting if the process is sufficiently slow. Fighting now rather than later can also reduce the total cost of fighting.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Powell, 2012. "Persistent Fighting and Shifting Power," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(3), pages 620-637, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:56:y:2012:i:3:p:620-637
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00575.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Maxime Menuet & Petros G. Sekeris, 2021. "Overconfidence and conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(4), pages 1483-1499, October.
    2. Gilles Grandjean & Petros G. Sekeris, 2017. "The timing of contests," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(2), pages 137-149, March.
    3. T. Clark Durant & Michael Weintraub, 2014. "How to make democracy self-enforcing after civil war: Enabling credible yet adaptable elite pacts," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(5), pages 521-540, November.
    4. Zachary C. Shirkey, 2020. "Which wars spread? Commitment problems and military intervention," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(2), pages 133-151, March.
    5. Nakao, Keisuke, 2019. "Moving Forward vs. Inflicting Costs in a Random-Walk Model of War," MPRA Paper 96071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Helios Herrera & Massimo Morelli & Salvatore Nunnari, 2022. "A Theory of Power Wars," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 17(1), pages 1-30, January.
    7. Yuri M. Zhukov, 2014. "Theory of Indiscriminate Violence," Working Paper 365551, Harvard University OpenScholar.
    8. Eoin F. McGuirk & Nathaniel Hilger & Nicholas Miller, 2023. "No Kin in the Game: Moral Hazard and War in the US Congress," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(9), pages 2370-2401.
    9. Philip Arena & Brian Hardt, 2014. "Incentives to Rebel, Bargaining, and Civil War," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(1), pages 127-141, January.
    10. Crost, Benjamin & Felter, Joseph H. & Johnston, Patrick B., 2016. "Conditional cash transfers, civil conflict and insurgent influence: Experimental evidence from the Philippines," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 171-182.
    11. Konyukhovskiy, Pavel V. & Grigoriadis, Theocharis, 2018. "Proxy wars," Discussion Papers 2018/4, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    12. Björn Gehrmann, 2019. "Third-party diplomacy," HiCN Working Papers 312, Households in Conflict Network.
    13. Robert Schub, 2017. "Unfair fights: Power asymmetry, nascent nuclear capability, and preventive conflict," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(4), pages 431-455, July.
    14. Nakao, Keisuke, 2017. "Denial vs. Punishment: Strategies Shape War, but War Itself Affects Strategies," MPRA Paper 81418, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Keisuke Nakao, 2022. "Denial and punishment in war," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 59(2), pages 166-179, March.
    16. Marco Nilsson, 2018. "Causal beliefs and war termination," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 55(1), pages 94-106, January.
    17. Nakao, Keisuke, 2022. "Democratic Victory and War Duration: Why Are Democracies Less Likely to Win Long Wars?," MPRA Paper 112849, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Ernesto Dal Bó & Pablo Hernández & Sebastián Mazzuca, 2015. "The Paradox of Civilization: Pre-Institutional Sources of Security and Prosperity," NBER Working Papers 21829, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Lisa Hultman & Jacob D. Kathman & Megan Shannon, 2016. "United Nations peacekeeping dynamics and the duration of post-civil conflict peace," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 33(3), pages 231-249, July.
    20. Antoine Pietri, 2017. "Les modèles de « rivalité coercitive » dans l’analyse économique des conflits," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(3), pages 307-352.
    21. Gehrmann, Björn, 2019. "Krieg, Frieden und Mediation - eine wettkampftheoretische Perspektive [War, Peace and Mediation - a Contest Theory Perspective]," MPRA Paper 93645, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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