IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/deveco/v118y2016icp171-182.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Conditional cash transfers, civil conflict and insurgent influence: Experimental evidence from the Philippines

Author

Listed:
  • Crost, Benjamin
  • Felter, Joseph H.
  • Johnston, Patrick B.

Abstract

Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs are an increasingly popular tool for reducing poverty in conflict-affected areas. Despite their growing popularity, there is limited evidence on how CCT programs affect conflict and theoretical predictions are ambiguous. We estimate the effect of conditional cash transfers on civil conflict in the Philippines by exploiting an experiment that randomly assigned eligibility for a CCT program at the village level. We find that cash transfers caused a substantial decrease in conflict-related incidents in treatment villages relative to control villages in the first 9months of the program. Using unique data on local insurgent influence, we also find that the program reduced insurgent influence in treated villages. An analysis of possible spillovers yields inconclusive results. While we find no statistical evidence of spillovers, we also cannot rule out that the village-level effect was due to displacement of insurgent activity from treatment to control villages.

Suggested Citation

  • Crost, Benjamin & Felter, Joseph H. & Johnston, Patrick B., 2016. "Conditional cash transfers, civil conflict and insurgent influence: Experimental evidence from the Philippines," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 171-182.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:118:y:2016:i:c:p:171-182
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.08.005
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387815000966
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thiemo Fetzer, 2014. "Can Workfare Programs Moderate Violence? Evidence from India," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 53, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    2. Eli Berman & Jacob N. Shapiro & Joseph H. Felter, 2011. "Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(4), pages 766-819.
    3. Nathan Nunn & Nancy Qian, 2014. "US Food Aid and Civil Conflict," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(6), pages 1630-1666, June.
    4. Arulpragasam, Jehan & Fernandez, Luisa & Matsuda, Yasuhiko & Olfindo, Rosechin & Stephens, Matt, 2011. "Building governance and anti-corruption in the Philippines'conditional cash transfer program," Social Protection and Labor Policy and Technical Notes 60234, The World Bank.
    5. Eli Berman & Michael Callen & Joseph H. Felter & Jacob N. Shapiro, 2011. "Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 55(4), pages 496-528, August.
    6. Fernandez, Luisa & Olfindo, Rosechin, 2011. "Overview of the Philippines'conditional cash transfer program : the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (Pantawid Pamilya)," Social Protection and Labor Policy and Technical Notes 69422, The World Bank.
    7. repec:cup:apsrev:v:97:y:2003:i:01:p:75-90_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Chioda, Laura & De Mello, João M.P. & Soares, Rodrigo R., 2016. "Spillovers from conditional cash transfer programs: Bolsa Família and crime in urban Brazil," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 306-320.
    9. Marco Manacorda & Edward Miguel & Andrea Vigorito, 2011. "Government Transfers and Political Support," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 1-28, July.
    10. Christopher Blattman & Edward Miguel, 2010. "Civil War," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 3-57, March.
    11. Edward Miguel & Michael Kremer, 2004. "Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education and Health in the Presence of Treatment Externalities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(1), pages 159-217, January.
    12. Marshall Burke & John Dykema & David Lobell & Edward Miguel & Shanker Satyanath, 2010. "Climate and Civil War: Is the Relationship Robust?," NBER Working Papers 16440, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Oeindrila Dube & Juan F. Vargas, 2013. "Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(4), pages 1384-1421.
    14. Alberto Abadie & Javier Gardeazabal, 2003. "The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study of the Basque Country," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 113-132, March.
    15. Mansour, Hani & Rees, Daniel I., 2012. "Armed conflict and birth weight: Evidence from the al-Aqsa Intifada," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 190-199.
    16. Humberto Lopez & Quentin Wodon, 2005. "The Economic Impact of Armed Conflict in Rwanda," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 14(4), pages 586-602, December.
    17. Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, 2014. "‘Revolutionary Taxation’ and the Logistical and Strategic Dilemmas of the Maoist Insurgency in the Philippines1," Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, , vol. 1(3), pages 263-287, December.
    18. Gaurav Khanna & Laura Zimmermann, 2014. "Fighting Maoist Violence with Promises: Evidence from India's Employment Guarantee Scheme," Economics of Peace and Security Journal, EPS Publishing, vol. 9(1), pages 30-36, April.
    19. Gianmarco León, 2012. "Civil Conflict and Human Capital Accumulation: The Long-term Effects of Political Violence in Perú," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 47(4), pages 991-1022.
    20. Labonne, Julien, 2013. "The local electoral impacts of conditional cash transfers," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 73-88.
    21. Ariel Fiszbein & Norbert Schady & Francisco H.G. Ferreira & Margaret Grosh & Niall Keleher & Pedro Olinto & Emmanuel Skoufias, 2009. "Conditional Cash Transfers : Reducing Present and Future Poverty," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 2597, January.
    22. World Bank, 2013. "Philippines Conditional Cash Transfer Program : Impact Evaluation 2012," World Bank Other Operational Studies 13244, The World Bank.
    23. Edward Miguel & Shanker Satyanath & Ernest Sergenti, 2004. "Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(4), pages 725-753, August.
    24. Fernandez, Luisa & Olfindo, Rosechin, 2011. "Overview of the Philippines'Conditional Cash Transfer Program : the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (Pantawid Pamilya)," Social Protection and Labor Policy and Technical Notes 62879, The World Bank.
    25. Ghobarah, H.A.Hazem Adam & Huth, Paul & Russett, Bruce, 2004. "The post-war public health effects of civil conflict," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 59(4), pages 869-884, August.
    26. Benjamin Crost & Joseph Felter & Patrick Johnston, 2014. "Aid under Fire: Development Projects and Civil Conflict," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(6), pages 1833-1856, June.
    27. Thiemo Fetzer, 2014. "Can Workfare Programs Moderate Violence? Evidence from India," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 053, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    28. Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-921, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Khanna, Gaurav & Zimmermann, Laura, 2017. "Guns and butter? Fighting violence with the promise of development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 120-141.
    2. repec:eee:wdevel:v:99:y:2017:i:c:p:431-440 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Tony Addison & Rachel Gisselquist & Miguel Niño-Zarazúa & Saurabh Singhal, 2015. "Needs vs Expediency - Poverty Reduction and Social Development in Post-Conflict Countries," Working Papers id:7371, eSocialSciences.
    4. repec:taf:jdevef:v:9:y:2017:i:4:p:519-542 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Paola Pena & Joaquin A. Urrego & Juan M. Villa, 2015. "Civil Conflict and Antipoverty Programmes: Effects on Demobilisation," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO CIEF 012748, UNIVERSIDAD EAFIT.
    6. Marshall Burke & Solomon M. Hsiang & Edward Miguel, 2015. "Climate and Conflict," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 7(1), pages 577-617, August.
    7. Jyotsna Puri & Anastasia Aladysheva & Vegard Iversen & Yashodhan Ghorpade & Tilman Brück, 2017. "Can rigorous impact evaluations improve humanitarian assistance?," Journal of Development Effectiveness, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(4), pages 519-542, October.
    8. repec:eee:wdevel:v:98:y:2017:i:c:p:506-522 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Mounu Prem & Andrés F. Rivera & Dario A. Romero & Juan F. Vargas, 2018. "Killing Social Leaders for Territorial Control: The Unintended Consequences of Peace," Documentos de Trabajo 016385, Universidad del Rosario.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:118:y:2016:i:c:p:171-182. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.