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Gang rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance

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  • Blattman, Christopher
  • Lessing, Benjamin
  • Tobon, Santiago
  • Duncan, Gustavo

Abstract

Gangs govern millions worldwide. Why rule? and how do they respond to states? Many argue that criminal rule provides protection when states do not, and that increasing state services could crowd gangs out. We began by interviewing leaders from 30 criminal groups in Medellín. The conventional view overlooks gangs’ indirect incentives to rule: governing keeps police out and fosters civilian loyalty, protecting other business lines. We present a model of duopolistic competition with returns to loyalty and show under what conditions exogenous changes to state protection causes gangs to change governance levels. We run the first gang-level field experiment, intensifying city governance in select neighborhoods for two years. We see no decrease in gang rule. We also examine a quasi-experiment. New borders in Medellín created discontinuities in access to government services for 30 years. Gangs responded to greater state rule by governing more. We propose alternatives for countering criminal governance.

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  • Blattman, Christopher & Lessing, Benjamin & Tobon, Santiago & Duncan, Gustavo, 2021. "Gang rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance," SocArXiv 5nyqs, Center for Open Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:5nyqs
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/5nyqs
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    1. Daniel Mejía & Ervyn Norza & Santiago Tobón & Martín Vanegas-Arias, 2022. "Broken windows policing and crime: Evidence from 80 Colombian cities," Chapters, in: Paolo Buonanno & Paolo Vanin & Juan Vargas (ed.), A Modern Guide to the Economics of Crime, chapter 4, pages 55-87, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Blattman, Christopher & Duncan, Gustavo & Lessing, Benjamin & Tobon, Santiago, 2022. "State-building on the Margin: An Urban Experiment in Medellín," SocArXiv 3bncz, Center for Open Science.
    3. Trudeau, Jessie, 2022. "Limiting aggressive policing can reduce police and civilian violence," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    4. Escobar, Maria A. & Tobón, Santiago & Vanegas-Arias, Martín, 2023. "Production and persistence of criminal skills: Evidence from a high-crime context," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    5. Miller, Ben & Rettberg, Angelika, 2023. "“Todos Pagan”: Las PYME y la violencia urbana en Medellín, Colombia," Documentos CEDE 20999, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    6. Raphael Bruce & Alexsandros Cavgias & Luis Meloni, 2022. "Policy Enforcement in the Presence of Organized Crime: Evidence from Rio de Janeiro," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2022_22, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
    7. Herrera, Joel Salvador & Martinez-Alvarez, Cesar B., 2022. "Diversifying violence: Mining, export-agriculture, and criminal governance in Mexico," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    8. Santiago Tobón Zapata & Maria Antonia Escobar Bernal & Martin Vanegas Arias, 2021. "Criminal capital persistence: Evidence from 90,000 inmates’ releases," Documentos de Trabajo de Valor Público 19297, Universidad EAFIT.
    9. Abril, Veronica & Perez-Vincent, Santiago & Tobon, Santiago & Vanegas-Arias, Martin, 2022. "How to measure public trust in the police? A framework with an application for Colombia," SocArXiv 89shw, Center for Open Science.
    10. Santiago Gómez & Daniel Mejía & Santiago Tobón, 2021. "The Deterrent Effect Of Surveillance Cameras On Crime," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 40(2), pages 553-571, March.
    11. Anna-Katharina Lenz & Martin Valdivia, 2023. "Nudging microentrepreneurs under fire: Experimental evidence from favelas in Rio de Janeiro," Working Papers 194, Peruvian Economic Association.
    12. Cavgias, Alexsandros & Bruce, Raphael & Meloni, Luis, 2023. "Policy enforcement in the presence of organized crime: Evidence from Rio de Janeiro," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    13. Jenny Pearce & Alexandra Abello Colak, 2021. "Humanizing Security through Action‐oriented Research in Latin America," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 52(6), pages 1370-1395, November.
    14. Vijayendra Rao, 2023. "Can Economics Become More Reflexive? Exploring the Potential of Mixed Methods," Springer Books, in: Ashwini Deshpande (ed.), Handbook on Economics of Discrimination and Affirmative Action, chapter 14, pages 323-349, Springer.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • E26 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Informal Economy; Underground Economy
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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