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Legitimacy in Criminal Governance: Managing a Drug Empire from Behind Bars

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  • LESSING, BENJAMIN
  • WILLIS, GRAHAM DENYER

Abstract

States, rebels, and mafias all provide governance beyond their core membership; increasingly, so do prison gangs. US gangs leverage control over prison life to govern street-level drug markets. Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) gang goes further, orchestrating paralyzing attacks on urban targets, while imposing a social order throughout slums that sharply reduces homicides. We analyze hundreds of seized PCC documents detailing its drug business and internal disciplinary system. Descriptively, we find vast, consignment-based trafficking operations whose profits fund collective benefits for members’ families; elaborate bureaucratic procedures and recordkeeping; and overwhelmingly nonviolent punishments for debt-nonpayment and misconduct. These features, we argue, reflect a deliberate strategy of creating rational-bureaucratic legitimacy in criminal governance. The PCC’s collectivist norms, fair procedures, and meticulous “criminal criminal records” facilitate community stigmatization of infractors, giving mild sanctions punitive heft and inducing widespread voluntary compliance without excessive coercion. This has aided the PCC’s rapid expansion across Brazil.

Suggested Citation

  • Lessing, Benjamin & Willis, Graham Denyer, 2019. "Legitimacy in Criminal Governance: Managing a Drug Empire from Behind Bars," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 113(2), pages 584-606, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:113:y:2019:i:02:p:584-606_00
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Jaime Wilches & Daniela Rivera Ortega & Hugo Fernando Guerrero Sierra & Román Villarreal, 2024. "Brechas de género y gobernanzas criminales del narcotráfico en Latinoamérica," Revista Finanzas y Politica Economica, Universidad Católica de Colombia, vol. 16(1), pages 181-214.
    4. Pierfrancesco Rolla & Patricia Justino, 2022. "The social consequences of organized crime in Italy," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2022-106, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    5. Blume, Laura Ross, 2021. "Narco Robin Hoods: Community support for illicit economies and violence in rural Central America," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    6. Silverio-Murillo, Adan & Balmori-de-la-Miyar, Jose & Sobrino, Fernanda & Prudencio, Daniel, 2024. "Do earthquakes increase or decrease crime?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 182(C).
    7. David Skarbek, 2024. "The political economy of criminal governance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(1), pages 1-24, July.
    8. Battiston, Giacomo & Bizzarri, Matteo & Franceschin, Riccardo, 2025. "Third-party interest, resource value, and the likelihood of conflict," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    9. Christopher Blattman & Gustavo Duncan & Benjamin Lessing & Santiago Tobón, 2025. "Gang Rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 92(3), pages 1497-1531.
    10. repec:osf:socarx:5nyqs_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Jefferson DP Bertolai & Luiz GDS Scorzafave, 2021. "Property rights’ emergence in illicit drug markets," Rationality and Society, , vol. 33(1), pages 52-105, February.
    12. Thomas Grisaffi, 2022. "Why Is the Drug Trade Not Violent? Cocaine Production and the Embedded Economy in the Chapare, Bolivia," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 53(3), pages 576-599, May.
    13. Bogliaccini, Juan A. & Flores-Macías, Gustavo A. & Tealde, Emiliano, 2024. "Recidivism, Labor Markets, and Prison Conditions: Evidence from Uruguay," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 183(C).

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