Legitimacy in Criminal Governance: Managing a Drug Empire from Behind Bars
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Cited by:
- Christopher Blattman & Gustavo Duncan & Benjamin Lessing & Santiago Tobón, 2025.
"Gang Rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 92(3), pages 1497-1531.
- Blattman, Christopher & Lessing, Benjamin & Tobon, Santiago & Duncan, Gustavo, 2021. "Gang rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance," SocArXiv 5nyqs, Center for Open Science.
- Christopher Blattman & Gustavo Duncan & Benjamin Lessing & Santiago Tobón, 2021. "Gang rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance," NBER Working Papers 28458, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Deepen, Yannick & Kurtenbach, Sabine, 2023. "Coping with complexity: Dealing with non-state armed actors," GIGA Working Papers 337, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
- Jaime Wilches & Daniela Rivera Ortega & Hugo Fernando Guerrero Sierra & Román Villarreal, 2024. "Brechas de género y gobernanzas criminales del narcotráfico en Latinoamérica," Revista Finanzas y Politica Economica, Universidad Católica de Colombia, vol. 16(1), pages 181-214.
- Pierfrancesco Rolla & Patricia Justino, 2022. "The social consequences of organized crime in Italy," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2022-106, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
- Blume, Laura Ross, 2021. "Narco Robin Hoods: Community support for illicit economies and violence in rural Central America," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
- repec:osf:socarx:5nyqs_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
- Silverio-Murillo, Adan & Balmori-de-la-Miyar, Jose & Sobrino, Fernanda & Prudencio, Daniel, 2024. "Do earthquakes increase or decrease crime?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 182(C).
- Jefferson DP Bertolai & Luiz GDS Scorzafave, 2021. "Property rights’ emergence in illicit drug markets," Rationality and Society, , vol. 33(1), pages 52-105, February.
- Thomas Grisaffi, 2022. "Why Is the Drug Trade Not Violent? Cocaine Production and the Embedded Economy in the Chapare, Bolivia," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 53(3), pages 576-599, May.
- David Skarbek, 2024. "The political economy of criminal governance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(1), pages 1-24, July.
- Bogliaccini, Juan A. & Flores-Macías, Gustavo A. & Tealde, Emiliano, 2024. "Recidivism, Labor Markets, and Prison Conditions: Evidence from Uruguay," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 183(C).
- Battiston, Giacomo & Bizzarri, Matteo & Franceschin, Riccardo, 2025.
"Third-party interest, resource value, and the likelihood of conflict,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
- Giacomo Battiston & Matteo Bizzarri & Riccardo Franceschin, 2021. "Third-Party Interest, Resource Value, and the Likelihood of Conflict," CSEF Working Papers 631, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 20 Jun 2022.
- Giacomo Battiston & Matteo Bizzarri & Riccardo Franceschin, 2022. "Third-Party Interest, Resource Value, and the Likelihood of Conflict," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0287, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
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