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Rents, Rules or Revolution: A Survey of Institutional Pathways to Peace

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  • Hannes Mueller
  • Laura Mayoral

Abstract

This paper reviews the growing literature on the relationship between institutions—political, administrative, and economic—and the emergence and prevention of armed conflict. We synthesize evidence showing how strong, inclusive, and accountable institutions, including democratic governance and robust state capacity, can reduce the risk of conflict through multiple mechanisms such as inclusion, deterrence, credible commitment, and the effective provision of public goods. At the same time, we examine how conflict can erode institutional quality, creating self-reinforcing cycles of fragility and underdevelopment. The review concludes with a set of policy recommendations aimed at breaking these cycles and outlines a forward- looking research agenda to deepen our understanding of how institutional reform can foster peace and resilience in fragile and conflict-prone settings.

Suggested Citation

  • Hannes Mueller & Laura Mayoral, 2025. "Rents, Rules or Revolution: A Survey of Institutional Pathways to Peace," Working Papers 1511, Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:1511
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    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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