Mises, bastiat, public opinion, and public choice
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More about this item
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- B53 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Austrian
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
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