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A subjectivist’s solution to the limits of public choice

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  • Anthony Evans

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Abstract

In light of Wittman ( 1995 ) and Caplan ( 2007 ) this paper contends that the rational-choice approach to political science (“Public Choice theory”) has reached a dead end. By critiquing their treatment of rationality, knowledge assumptions, and views of the democratic process, an alternative is presented based on the core insight of the “Epistemic Primacy Thesis”. This subjectivist approach to political economy is introduced in light of an existing debate between the compatibility (or otherwise) of Austrian economics and Public Choice theory. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Anthony Evans, 2014. "A subjectivist’s solution to the limits of public choice," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 27(1), pages 23-44, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:revaec:v:27:y:2014:i:1:p:23-44
    DOI: 10.1007/s11138-013-0227-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Entrepreneurship; Government failure; Public choice; Rational choice; Subjectivism; B52; B53; D83; H11;

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
    • B53 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Austrian
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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