A subjectivist’s solution to the limits of public choice
In light of Wittman ( 1995 ) and Caplan ( 2007 ) this paper contends that the rational-choice approach to political science (“Public Choice theory”) has reached a dead end. By critiquing their treatment of rationality, knowledge assumptions, and views of the democratic process, an alternative is presented based on the core insight of the “Epistemic Primacy Thesis”. This subjectivist approach to political economy is introduced in light of an existing debate between the compatibility (or otherwise) of Austrian economics and Public Choice theory. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014
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Volume (Year): 27 (2014)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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