The taming of Leviathan: Competition among governments
This paper assesses the consequences of a high degree of international capital mobility for the behavior of governments. It is argued that countries can be seen as clubs where the government as club management acts as an entrepreneur attempting to attract internationally mobile resources. Within this stylized model it is shown that competition induces the government of a small democratic country to implement policy reforms that increase the welfare of domestic residents if it wants to be reelected. This result suggests that international openness may be a substitute for more overt attempts to contain a government's Leviathan tendencies such as constitutional amendments. Finally, the case against competition among governments is analyzed from the perspective of the club model developed in the paper. Copyright George Mason University 1992
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 3 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/political+science/journal/10602/PS2|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Roland VAUBEL, 1985. "International Collusion or Competition for Macroeconomic Policy Coordination? A Restatement," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1985031, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Hans-Werner Sinn, 1990.
"Tax Harmonization and Tax Competition in Europe,"
NBER Working Papers
3248, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416.
- Demsetz, Harold, 1969. "Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 1-22, April.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:3:y:1992:i:2:p:177-196. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.