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Le fédéralisme financier, perspectives de microéconomie spatiale

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  • Guy Gilbert

Abstract

[fre] La théorie économique du fédéralisme fiscal repose pour l'essentiel sur les concepts et les résultats fondamentaux de l'analyse micro-économique publique locale dont l'article fournit une synthèse de la littérature récente. Au fédéralisme fonctionnel de Musgrave-Oates a succédé progressivement une analyse centrée sur les comportements stratégiques des acteurs. Pour être pleinement pertinente, celle-ci doit ajouter aux développements normatifs une théorie positive de l'écono­mie politique des finances intergouvernementales. [eng] The economic theory of fiscal federalism is based upon the concepts and the basic results of the microeconomics of urban public finance. The paper provides a review of the relevant literature. It emphasizes on the move from « fonctional federalism » à la Oates Musgrave to a framework based on the strategic behavior and interactions of governments of different levels. A more comprehensive theory is netherless needed which must include, besides normative results, a positive theory of intergovernmental fiscal relations.

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  • Guy Gilbert, 1996. "Le fédéralisme financier, perspectives de microéconomie spatiale," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 47(2), pages 311-363.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1996_num_47_2_409772
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1996.409772
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    1. Marc Baudry & Matthieu Leprince & Cyriaque Moreau, 2002. "Préférences révélées, bien public local et électeur médian : tests sur données françaises," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 156(5), pages 125-146.

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