IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Concurrence fiscale et intercommunalité

  • Thierry Madiès

[fre] Après avoir présenté les principaux résultats concernant les effets de la concurrence fiscale sur l'offre de biens publics locaux et les taux d'impôt d'équilibre, nous poserons la question de la coopération fiscale intercommunale comme moyen de réduire les disparités de taux de taxe professionnelle. Nous montrerons alors, qu'à défaut d'avoir pu imposer la fusion de communes comme dans d'autres pays, l'élargissement de la zone de prélèvement de la taxe professionnelle peut se révéler économiquement efficace même si elle soulève deux types de difficultés. En premier lieu, il s'agit de délimiter le territoire de prélèvement : national comme le suggère le Conseil des impôts, régional, départemental ou plus pragmatiquement en essayant de fédérer les groupements de communes préexistants (loi du 6 février 1992). En second lieu, se pose la question de la participation de communes de taille différente - communes « centres » et communes « périphériques » - à un groupement de communes car la concurrence ne s'exerce pas de la même façon sur les unes et sur les autres. Nous dresserons enfin un bilan des groupements de communes à fiscalité propre. [eng] Tax competition and local government cooperation Thierry Madiès, This paper starts with a survey of major results concerning the effects of tax competition on the supply of local public goods and equilibrium tax rates. We then raise the issue of tax cooperation amongst local governments as a means of reducing the spread between local rates of business taxation. We show that, insofar as France, in contrast with most other developed countries, has not been able to impose mergers on local governments, enlarging the area over which taxation of businesses is applied may be economically efficient. However, two types of difficulties have to be solved. First, what is the best choice for the tax jurisdiction ? : Is it the national economy, as suggested by the French National Tax Council, or the regions, or else, more pragmati- cally, a federated group of local governments, as encouraged by the Law of February 1992 ? Second, are localities of different sizes — in particular center cities and suburban governments — willing to cooperate in taxation, while the effects of tax competition differ according to size ? The last section offers a brief survey of what has been achieved so far in France in terms of federating local government entities.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.3406/ofce.1997.1478
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://www.persee.fr/doc/ofce_0751-6614_1997_num_63_1_1478
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue de l'OFCE.

Volume (Year): 63 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 195-228

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:prs:rvofce:ofce_0751-6614_1997_num_63_1_1478
Note: DOI:10.3406/ofce.1997.1478
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/collection/ofce

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Michel Houdebine & Jean-Luc Schneider, 1997. "Mesurer l'influence de la fiscalité sur la localisation des entreprises," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 131(5), pages 47-64.
  2. Wilson, John Douglas, 1991. "Tax competition with interregional differences in factor endowments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 423-451, November.
  3. Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 877-92, September.
  4. Robert W. Wassmer, 1994. "Can Local Incentives Alter a Metropolitan City's Economic Development?," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 31(8), pages 1251-1278, October.
  5. Mintz, J. & Tulkens, H., 1984. "Commodity tax competition between member states of a federation: equilibrium and efficiency," CORE Discussion Papers 1984027, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Hoyt, William H., 1991. "Property taxation, Nash equilibrium, and market power," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 123-131, July.
  7. Leslie E. Papke, 1991. "Tax Policy and Urban Development: Evidence From The Indiana Enterprise Zone Program," NBER Working Papers 3945, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Newman, Robert J. & Sullivan, Dennis H., 1988. "Econometric analysis of business tax impacts on industrial location: What do we know, and how do we know it?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 215-234, March.
  9. Chris Doyle & Sweder Wijnbergen, 1994. "Taxation of foreign multinationals: A sequential bargaining approach to tax holidays," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 211-225, October.
  10. Wilson, John D., 1986. "A theory of interregional tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 296-315, May.
  11. Wildasin, David E., 1988. "Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 229-240, March.
  12. de Crombrugghe, Alain & Tulkens, Henry, 1990. "On Pareto improving commodity tax changes under fiscal competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 335-350, April.
  13. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416.
  14. WILDASIN, David E., . "Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy," CORE Discussion Papers RP 831, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  15. Anderson, John E. & Wassmer, Robert W., 1995. "The decision to 'bid for business': Municipal behavior in granting property tax abatements," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 739-757, December.
  16. John Kennan & Raymond Riezman, 2013. "Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 4, pages 45-51 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  17. Hwang, Hae-shin & Choe, Byeongho, 1995. "Distribution of factor endowments and tax competition," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 655-673, October.
  18. Bucovetsky, Sam & Wilson, John Douglas, 1991. "Tax competition with two tax instruments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 333-350, November.
  19. King, Ian & McAfee, R. Preston & Welling, Linda., 1990. "Industrial Blackmail of Local Governments," Working Papers 739, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  20. Coates, Dennis, 1993. "Property tax competition in a repeated game," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 111-119, March.
  21. Zodrow, George R. & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1986. "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 356-370, May.
  22. King, I. & McAfee, R.P. & Welling, L., 1990. "Industrial Blackmail," Papers 130, Calgary - Department of Economics.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:rvofce:ofce_0751-6614_1997_num_63_1_1478. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Equipe PERSEE)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.