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Begünstigungen und Schranken in der europäischen Unternehmensbesteuerung – eine evolutorisch-ökonomische Sicht / Preferential treatments and barriers in the European company taxation – an evolutionary-economic perspective

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  • Melle Marco C.

Abstract

The intention of the present paper is to investigate and evaluate rule transfers in the European company taxation from an evolutionary-economic perspective. In the literature total competition respectively „harmonisation from below“ and total harmonisation respectively „harmonisation from above“ seem to stand irreconcilably against each other while a middle way of minimal harmonisation in a common economic and monetary area is largely neglected. In contrast it shall be asked here if not a certain diversity of taxation is realistic instead of harmonisation from above. If the answer is yes, then it is worth considering for the European company taxes a political compromise between competition and harmonisation in order to confront tax obstacles in the single market.

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  • Melle Marco C., 2015. "Begünstigungen und Schranken in der europäischen Unternehmensbesteuerung – eine evolutorisch-ökonomische Sicht / Preferential treatments and barriers in the European company taxation – an evolutionary," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 66(1), pages 115-146, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:66:y:2015:i:1:p:115-146:n:8
    DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2015-0108
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