How Much Europe? Subsidiarity, Centralization and Fiscal Competition
This paper attempts to give a meaning to the empty concept of subsidiarity. It examines various kinds of government activity with respect to the optimal layer of government in Europe at which these activities should be performed. The paper criticizes Europe's industrial policies and its protectionism, and it points to European-wide public-goods and redistribution problems which make centralized government actions a matter of necessity. The paper's main focus is on the free movement of goods, capital, labour and services. It is argued that these movements will induce a process of fierce fiscal competition in which an inverse redistribution from the poor to the rich will emerge, where consumer protection becomes eroded and environmental standards are overdrawn.
|Date of creation:||Sep 1993|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
|Order Information:|| Email: |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:834. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.