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State‐Federal Resource Tax Rivalry: The Queensland Railway and the Federal Export Tax

Author

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  • J. H. CASSING
  • A. L. HILLMAN

Abstract

This paper presents a stylized account and analysis of the implications of the intergovernmental tax rivalry which arises between the Queensland and Federal governments in their efforts to tax resource rents. In particular, coal is taxed explicitly through the Federal export levy and implicitly through the Queensland railways ‘excess rail freight’. A game‐theoretic environment thus arises. It is shown that if each government sets its tax rate optimally in reaction to the other government's tax polity, then less revenue is generated at a higher deadweight cost. The optimal cooperative solution is compared to the non‐cooperative equilibrium and the resulting welfare gains are identified.

Suggested Citation

  • J. H. Cassing & A. L. Hillman, 1982. "State‐Federal Resource Tax Rivalry: The Queensland Railway and the Federal Export Tax," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 58(3), pages 235-241, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:58:y:1982:i:3:p:235-241
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4932.1982.tb00371.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Melle Marco C., 2015. "Begünstigungen und Schranken in der europäischen Unternehmensbesteuerung – eine evolutorisch-ökonomische Sicht / Preferential treatments and barriers in the European company taxation – an evolutionary," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 66(1), pages 115-146, January.
    2. Florence Lachet-Touya, 2013. "Tax Interactions with Asymmetric Information and Nonlinear Instruments," Working Papers hal-02945285, HAL.
    3. Sotiris Karkalakos & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2007. "A spatial analysis of provincial corporate income tax responses: evidence from Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 40(3), pages 782-811, August.
    4. Melle Marco C., 2014. "Eine europäische Bemessungsgrundlage für die Körperschaftsteuer? Konzeption und ordnungsökonomische Analyse / Conceptual design and constitutional economics analysis of a European tax base for corpora," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 65(1), pages 133-156, January.
    5. Florence Lachet-Touya, 2012. "Les interactions fiscales verticales à la lumière de la théorie des multiprincipaux," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 78(1), pages 27-46.
    6. Lisa Grazzini & Alessandro Petretto, 2007. "Tax Competition between Unitary and Federal Countries," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 17-36, January.
    7. Florence Lachet-Touya, 2013. "Tax Interactions with Asymmetric Information and Nonlinear Instruments," Working papers of CATT hal-02945285, HAL.
    8. Hatfield, John William, 2013. "Revenue Decentralization, the Local Income Tax Deduction, and the Provision of Public Goods," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 66(1), pages 97-115, March.
    9. Ann Cavlovic & Harriet Jackson, "undated". "Bother thy neighbour? Intergovernmental Tax Interactions in the Canadian Federation," Working Papers-Department of Finance Canada 2003-09, Department of Finance Canada.
    10. Michael Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2003. "Leviathan and Capital Tax Competition in Federations," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 177-199, April.
    11. Michael Keen, 1998. "Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(3), pages 454-485, September.
    12. Florence TOUYA, 2013. "Tax Interactions with Asymmetric Information and Nonlinear Instruments," Working Papers 2012-2013_9, CATT - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour, revised Jul 2013.
    13. Keen, Michael J. & Kotsogiannis, Christos, 2004. "Tax competition in federations and the welfare consequences of decentralization," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 397-407, November.

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