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Tax Interactions with Asymmetric Information and Nonlinear Instruments

Listed author(s):
  • Florence TOUYA

Tax Interactions with Asymmetric Information and Nonlinear Instruments

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File URL: http://catt.univ-pau.fr/live/digitalAssets/90/90597_9DocWcattTaxInteractionsAsymmetricInformationFTouya.pdf
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Paper provided by CATT - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour in its series Working Papers with number 9.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2009
Date of revision: Nov 2009
Handle: RePEc:tac:wpaper:9
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  1. Andersson, Linda & Aronsson, Thomas & Wikström, Magnus, 2001. "Testing for Vertical Fiscal Externalities," Umeå Economic Studies 573, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
  2. Olsen, Trond E. & Osmundsen, Petter, 2001. "Strategic tax competition; implications of national ownership," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 253-277, August.
  3. Laurent Flochel & Thierry Madies, 2002. "Interjurisdictional Tax Competition in a Federal System of Overlapping Revenue Maximizing Governments," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(2), pages 121-141, March.
  4. Dahlby, Bev & Wilson, Leonard S., 2003. "Vertical fiscal externalities in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 917-930, May.
  5. Peters, Michael, 2001. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1349-1372, September.
  6. Olsen, Trond E. & Osmundsen, Petter, 2010. "Multinationals, tax competition and outside options," Discussion Papers 2010/13, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics.
  7. Larry Epstein & Michael Peters, 1996. "A Revelation Principle For Competing Mechanisms," Working Papers peters-96-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  8. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
  9. David Martimort, 1992. "Multi-principaux avec anti-sélection," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 28, pages 1-37.
  10. Michael Keen, 1997. "Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism," IMF Working Papers 97/173, .
  11. David E. Wildasin, 2005. "Fiscal Competition," Working Papers 2005-05, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
  12. Thierry Madiès & Yvon Rocaboy & Sonia Paty, 2004. "Horizontal and vertical externalities : an overview of theoritical and empirical studies," Post-Print halshs-00069010, HAL.
  13. Michael J. Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2002. "Tax competition in federations and the welfare consequences of decentralization," Discussion Papers 0201, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  14. Goodspeed, Timothy J., 2000. "Tax structure in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 493-506, March.
  15. Marius BRÜLHART & Mario JAMETTI, 2004. "Vertical Versus Horizontal Tax Externalities: An Empirical Test," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 04.11, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  16. Craig Brett & Joris Pinkse, 2000. "The determinants of municipal tax rates in British Columbia," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(3), pages 695-714, August.
  17. Michael Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2003. "Leviathan and Capital Tax Competition in Federations," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 177-199, 04.
  18. Masayoshi Hayashi & Robin Boadway, 2001. "An empirical analysis of intergovernmental tax interaction: the case of business income taxes in Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 34(2), pages 481-503, May.
  19. Tim Besley & Harvey S. Rosen, 1997. "Vertical externalities in tax settings: evidence from gasoline and cigarettes," IFS Working Papers W97/23, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  20. Goodspeed, Timothy J., 2002. "Tax competition and tax structure in open federal economies: Evidence from OECD countries with implications for the European Union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 357-374, February.
  21. Léonard,Daniel & Long,Ngo van, 1992. "Optimal Control Theory and Static Optimization in Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521337465, December.
  22. Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 1996. "Efficiency and the optimal direction of federal-state transfers," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 3(2), pages 137-155, May.
  23. Turnbull, Geoffrey K & Djoundourian, Salpie S, 1993. "Overlapping Jurisdictions: Substitutes or Complements?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 75(3), pages 231-245, March.
  24. BOADWAY, Robin & MARCHAND, Maurice & VIGNEAULT, Marianne, "undated". "The consequences of overlapping tax bases for redistribution and public spending in a federation," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1326, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  25. Giacomo Calzolari, 2004. "Incentive Regulation of Multinational Enterprises," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(1), pages 257-282, 02.
  26. Wilson, John Douglas & Wildasin, David E., 2004. "Capital tax competition: bane or boon," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(6), pages 1065-1091, June.
  27. Esteller-More, Alex & Sole-Olle, Albert, 2001. "Vertical income tax externalities and fiscal interdependence: evidence from the US," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2-3), pages 247-272, April.
  28. repec:adr:anecst:y:1992:i:28:p:01 is not listed on IDEAS
  29. Michael J. Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2002. "Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High Taxes?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 363-370, March.
  30. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2009. "Market participation in delegated and intrinsic common-agency games," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 78-102.
  31. Rizzo, Leonzio, 2005. "Interaction between Vertical and Horizontal tax Competition: Theory and Evidence," MPRA Paper 5334, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  32. Charles B. Wagoner, 1995. "Local Fiscal Competition: an Intraregional Perspective," Public Finance Review, SAGE Publishing, vol. 23(1), pages 95-114, January.
  33. Johnson, William R, 1988. "Income Redistribution in a Federal System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 570-573, June.
  34. repec:ntj:journl:v:51:y:1998:i:n._2:p:219-38 is not listed on IDEAS
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