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The good, the bad and the populist: A model of political agency with emotional voters

  • Jennings, Colin

This paper extends the political agency approach to an environment in which voting is categorised into informed and instrumental, informed and ‘expressive’, and uninformed due to ‘rational irrationality’. Politicians may be “good”, “bad”, or “populist”. Initially the existence of only good and populist politicians is assumed: the incentives for good politicians to pool with or separate from populists are investigated and the implications for voter welfare are explored. Then the consequences of the inclusion of bad politicians are considered. The paper makes three main contributions. First, I provide a rational choice analysis of populism as populism is commonly understood. Second, I locate a potential role for government as a persuasive provider of information regarding the quality of policy. Third, when bad politicians are added to the analysis, it is shown that a little potential corruption can improve voter welfare.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 27 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 611-624

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:27:y:2011:i:4:p:611-624
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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