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A Theory of Political Entrenchment

Author

Listed:
  • Gilles Saint‐Paul
  • Davide Ticchi
  • Andrea Vindigni

Abstract

Can an incumbent political party increase its chances at re-election by implementing inefficient policies that harm its constituency? This paper studies the possibility of such a phenomenon, which we label political entrenchment. We use a two-party dynamic model of redistribution with probabilistic voting. Political entrenchment by the Left occurs only if incumbency rents are sufficiently high. Low-skill citizens may vote for this party even though they rationally expect the adoption of these policies. We discuss: the possibility of entrenchment by the Right; the scope for commitment to avoid entrenchment policies; and the effect of state capacity, income inequality and party popularity on the likelihood of entrenchment. We illustrate our theory with a number of historical examples.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Gilles Saint‐Paul & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2016. "A Theory of Political Entrenchment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(593), pages 1238-1263, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:econjl:v:126:y:2016:i:593:p:1238-1263
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecoj.2016.126.issue-593
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    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Leftist Tories?
      by chris dillow in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2013-02-18 20:23:46
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      by Chris Dillow in Chris Dillow on 2026-03-02 09:33:29
    3. "In it for themselves"
      by Chris Dillow in Chris Dillow on 2026-04-09 07:54:12
    4. Wnated: class consciousness
      by chris dillow in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2014-11-23 18:29:24
    5. When failure succeeds
      by chris in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2019-04-19 11:56:53
    6. On Tory paradoxes
      by chris in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2019-09-08 12:58:39

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel J. Smith & George R. Crowley & J. Sebastian Leguizamon, 2021. "Long live the doge? Death as a term limit on Venetian chief executives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(3), pages 333-359, September.
    2. Christian Roessler & Sandro Shelegia & Bruno Strulovici, 2018. "Collective Commitment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(1), pages 347-380.
    3. Gheibi, Shahryar & Fay, Scott, 2021. "The impact of supply disruption risk on a retailer’s pricing and procurement strategies in the presence of a substitute product," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 97(3), pages 359-376.
    4. Gersbach, Hans & Tejada, Oriol, 2018. "A Reform Dilemma in polarized democracies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 148-158.
    5. Saint-Paul, Gilles, 2021. "Pareto-improving structural reforms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    6. Daniel J. Smith, 2020. "Turn-taking in office," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 205-226, June.
    7. Matthias Wrede, 2019. "The incumbent’s preference for imperfect commitment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 285-300, September.
    8. Rodriguez Acosta, Mauricio, 2016. "Essays in political economy and resource economic : A macroeconomic approach," Other publications TiSEM 1e39ef1b-43a2-4f95-892c-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Maxime Menuet & Patrick Villieu, 2021. "Reputation and the “need for enemies”," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(4), pages 1049-1089, November.
    10. Manuel Oechslin & Mauricio Rodriguez, 2021. "Fiscal weakness, the (under-) provision of public services, and institutional reform," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(1), pages 20-44, January.
    11. Da Silva, António Dias & Givone, Audrey & Sondermann, David, 2017. "When do countries implement structural reforms?," Working Paper Series 2078, European Central Bank.
    12. Jan Fałkowski & Grażyna Bukowska, 2016. "Monopolizacja władzy a wyniki gospodarcze na poziomie Polski lokalnej," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 2, pages 91-120.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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