Entrepreneurship: Catallactic and constitutional perspectives
The most important distinction between Virginia political economy (VPE) and the other branches of public choice scholarship is a close affinity of the former to Austrian economics. Contributions in both the Virginia and the Vienna (Austrian) traditions have emphasized this connection and highlighted the analytical and ideological interdependencies of the two schools. This paper argues that an application of the Austrian theory of political entrepreneurship to the VPE framework can provide important insights regarding the direction of political change. Kirzner’s theory of entrepreneurship explains that coordination of individual action is possible where price signals provide information. When price signals are absent the entrepreneurial process breaks down. There is common ground between Kirznerian entrepreneurship and Buchanan’s creative action. Scholars at the intersection of the Virginia and the Vienna traditions can use this common ground to make pattern predictions regarding the direction of political change. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014
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- Holcombe, Randall G, 2002. " Political Entrepreneurship and the Democratic Allocation of Economic Resources," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 15(2-3), pages 143-59, June.
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- Christopher Coyne & Russell Sobel & John Dove, 2010. "The non-productive entrepreneurial process," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 333-346, December.
- Ikeda, Sanford, 2003. " How Compatible Are Public Choice and Austrian Political Economy?," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 63-75, March.
- Buchanan, James M & Vanberg, Viktor J, 2002. " Constitutional Implications of Radical Subjectivism," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 15(2-3), pages 121-29, June.
- Sutter, Daniel, 2002. " The Democratic Efficiency Debate and Definitions of Political Equilibrium," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 15(2-3), pages 199-209, June.
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