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Regulatory Disequilibrium and Inefficiency: The Case of Interstate Trucking

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  • Benson, Bruce L

Abstract

Economic regulation is characterized as (1) an effort by special interests to influence the allocation of property rights, in (2) a continuous path-dependent spontaneous evolution (as opposed to a static equilibrium), driven by (3) market, political, and bureaucratic entrepreneurship in an ongoing discovery process. The implications of the model are illustrated by an examination of the evolution of regulation in interstate trucking. The model is also used to explain that the Chicago School's political-regulatory efficiency conclusions are incorrect, and that the inefficiencies arising from rent seeking are even greater than the Public Choice approach implies. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Benson, Bruce L, 2002. "Regulatory Disequilibrium and Inefficiency: The Case of Interstate Trucking," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 15(2-3), pages 229-255, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:revaec:v:15:y:2002:i:2-3:p:229-55
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jari Eloranta, 2009. "Rent seeking and collusion in the military allocation decisions of Finland, Sweden, and Great Britain, 1920-38 -super-1," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 62(1), pages 23-44, February.
    2. Diana W. Thomas, 2009. "Deregulation despite transitional gains," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 329-340, September.
    3. Brian Meehan & Bruce Benson, 2015. "The occupations of regulators influence occupational regulation: evidence from the US private security industry," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(1), pages 97-117, January.
    4. Joshua Shackman & Glen Tenney, 2006. "The Effects of Government Regulations on the Supply of Pawn Loans: Evidence from 51 Jurisdictions in the U.S," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 30(1), pages 69-91, August.
    5. Fred S. McChesney, 2010. "The Economic Analysis of Corruption," Chapters,in: Handbook on the Economics of Crime, chapter 9 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Diana Thomas & Michael Thomas, 2014. "Entrepreneurship: Catallactic and constitutional perspectives," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 27(1), pages 11-22, March.
    7. Bruce L. Benson, 2015. "Regulation As a Barrier to Market Provision and to Innovation: The Case of Toll Roads and Steam Carriages in England," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 30(Spring 20), pages 61-87.
    8. Douhan, Robin & Henrekson, Magnus, 2007. "The Political Economy of Entrepreneurship," Working Paper Series 716, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    9. Diana W. Thomas & Peter T. Leeson, 2012. "Purpose – This paper seeks to examine how productive entrepreneurial activities, such as innovation, influence unproductive entrepreneurial activities, such as regulatory rent seeking. Design/methodol," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 1(4), pages 84-95, April.
    10. Adam Martin & Diana Thomas, 2013. "Two-tiered political entrepreneurship and the congressional committee system," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(1), pages 21-37, January.
    11. Harper, David A., 2013. "Property rights, entrepreneurship and coordination," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 62-77.

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