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Two-tiered political entrepreneurship and the congressional committee system

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  • Adam Martin
  • Diana Thomas

Abstract

Theories of political entrepreneurship usually focus on the construction of coalitions necessary to change policy. We argue that political entrepreneurs who are unable to secure favored policies may redirect their efforts to a “higher tier,” attempting to change the rules of the game to enable the exploitation of future political profit opportunities. We present a taxonomy of three levels of political rules—pre-constitutional, constitutional, and post-constitutional—and identify the salient characteristics of institutional entrepreneurship that targets rules at each level. The development of the congressional committee system is explored as a case study in entrepreneurship over post-constitutional rules. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Adam Martin & Diana Thomas, 2013. "Two-tiered political entrepreneurship and the congressional committee system," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(1), pages 21-37, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:154:y:2013:i:1:p:21-37
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9805-z
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    Cited by:

    1. Lucas, David S. & Fuller, Caleb S. & Piano, Ennio E., 2018. "Rooking the state," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 12-20.
    2. Coyne,Christopher J., 2020. "Defense, Peace, and War Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108724036.
    3. Alexandre Padilla & Nicolás Cachanosky, 2016. "Indirectly productive entrepreneurship," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 5(2), pages 161-175, August.
    4. Diana Thomas & Michael Thomas, 2014. "Entrepreneurship: Catallactic and constitutional perspectives," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 27(1), pages 11-22, March.
    5. Raymond J. March & Adam G. Martin & Audrey Redford, 2016. "The substance of entrepreneurship and the entrepreneurship of substances," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 5(2), pages 201-220, August.
    6. Safner, Ryan, 2016. "Institutional entrepreneurship, wikipedia, and the opportunity of the commons," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(4), pages 743-771, December.
    7. Skarbek, Emily C., 2016. "Aid, ethics, and the Samaritan's dilemma: strategic courage in constitutional entrepreneurship," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 371-393, June.
    8. Andrew Smith & Graham Brownlow, 2023. "Informal Institutions as Inhibitors of Rent-Seeking Entrepreneurship: Evidence From U.S. Legal History," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 47(6), pages 2323-2346, November.
    9. Petrik Runst, 2014. "Crisis and belief: confirmation bias and the behavioral political economy of recession," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 376-392, December.
    10. Drometer, Marcus & Rincke, Johannes, 2014. "Electoral competition and endogenous barriers to entry," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 253-262.
    11. Virginia Rivas, 2018. "La reputación técnica y el emprendimiento de políticas como fuente de poderes: el caso de la Fiscalía Nacional Económica," Estudios Públicos, Centro de Estudios Públicos, vol. 0(152), pages 91-137.
    12. Arthur M. Diamond, Jr., 2021. "Build the Hill: How the Resilient Entrepreneur Can Persevere," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 36(Spring 20), pages 45-53.
    13. Joshua Y. Lerner, 2018. "Getting the message across: evaluating think tank influence in Congress," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(3), pages 347-366, June.
    14. repec:wly:soecon:v:80:4:y:2014:p:926-937 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Alexander William Salter, 2016. "Political Property Rights and Governance Outcomes: A Theory of the Corporate Polity," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 31(Winter 20), pages 1-20.
    16. Bryan P. Cutsinger, 2019. "The Durability of Legislative Benefits and the Role of the Executive Branch’s Settlement Authority," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 34(Spring 20), pages 1-14.
    17. Bryan P. Cutsinger & Alexander Marsella & Yang Zhou, 2022. "Insuring legislative wealth transfers: theory and evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(1), pages 127-144, July.
    18. William F. Shughart II & Diana W. Thomas, 2014. "What Did Economists Do? Euvoluntary, Voluntary, and Coercive Institutions for Collective Action," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 926-937, April.
    19. William F. Shughart & Diana W. Thomas, 2014. "What Did Economists Do? Euvoluntary, Voluntary, and Coercive Institutions for Collective Action," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 80(4), pages 926-937, April.
    20. G. P. Manish & Colin O’Reilly, 2019. "Banking regulation, regulatory capture and inequality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(1), pages 145-164, July.
    21. Ennio E. Piano & Rania Al-Bawwab, 2023. "The artist as entrepreneur," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 36(1), pages 23-41, March.
    22. Daniel D’Amico, 2012. "Comparative political economy when anarchism is on the table," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 25(1), pages 63-75, March.
    23. Audrey Redford, 2020. "Property rights, entrepreneurship, and economic development," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 33(1), pages 139-161, March.
    24. Alexander W. Salter, 2020. "Private Prerogative, Public Purpose: Political Entrepreneurship and Management in Frederick the Great’s Anti-Machiavel," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 35(Spring 20), pages 1-28.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Entrepreneurship; Congressional committee system; Collective action; Institutions; L26; D71; D72; D02;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact

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