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The industrial organization of Congress in USA and Spain: a comparative institutional analysis

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  • Gonzalo Caballero Miguez

    (Instituto Federal Electoral)

Abstract

The institutional and organizational details framing legislative processes are key aspects for understanding how Congresses work. From a new institutional economics perspective, this paper comparatively examines how the Spanish and USA Congresses are organized. The main purpose of the paper is to unveil the so-called "black box" factors operating in each case. The role played by property rights, hierarchy, individual deputies, leadership, transactions costs and committees will be researched. Whereas committees and decision-making rules based on a property rights system are key factors for understanding how the Congress performs in USA; in the Spanish case the most relevant explanatory factors are strong party leadership and the hierarchical rules by which political parties and parlamentary groups are organized.

Suggested Citation

  • Gonzalo Caballero Miguez, 2006. "The industrial organization of Congress in USA and Spain: a comparative institutional analysis," Revista de Analisis Economico – Economic Analysis Review, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business, vol. 21(2), pages 105-123, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ila:anaeco:v:21:y:2006:i:2:p:105-123
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Douglass C. North, 1990. "A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(4), pages 355-367, October.
    2. Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-163, February.
    3. Xosé Carlos Arias & Gonzalo Caballero, 2003. "Instituciones, costos de transacción y políticas públicas: un panorama," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 5(8), pages 117-146, January-J.
    4. Oliver E. Williamson, 2000. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(3), pages 595-613, September.
    5. Shepsle, Kenneth A. & Weingast, Barry R., 1987. "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(1), pages 85-104, March.
    6. Giandomenico Majone, 2001. "Nonmajoritarian Institutions and the Limits of Democratic Governance: A Political Transaction-Cost Approach," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(1), pages 57-78, March.
    7. Toboso, Fernando & Compés, Raúl, 2003. "Nuevas tendencias analíticas en el ámbito de la nueva economía institucional. La incorporación de los aspectos distributivos," El Trimestre Económico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, vol. 0(280), pages 637-671, octubre-d.
    8. Bernardo Pinheiro Machado Mueller & Lee Alston, 2001. "Coalitional Stability and the Gains From Trade Between the Executive and the Legislature in Brazil," Anais do XXIX Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 29th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 057, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    9. Krehbiel, Keith & Shepsle, Kenneth A. & Weingast, Barry R., 1987. "Why are Congressional Committees Powerful?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(3), pages 929-945, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economics of Institutions; Economic Analysis of Political Processes; Governance; Congress; New Institutional Economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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