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Transaction and transactors’ choices: What we have learned and what we need to explore

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  • Massimiliano Vatiero

Abstract

Despite the prolific literature on transaction costs, the concept of transaction still wants for a definition. This theoretical essay explains and recombines different—but closely related—dimensions of the transactional phenomenon (legal, competitive and political dimensions of a transaction) in order to identify promising avenues for future research.

Suggested Citation

  • Massimiliano Vatiero, 2021. "Transaction and transactors’ choices: What we have learned and what we need to explore," DEM Working Papers 2021/04, Department of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:trn:utwprg:2021/04
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