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The impact of the judiciary on entrepreneurship: Evaluation of Pakistan's "Access to Justice Programme"

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  • Chemin, Matthieu

Abstract

In 2002, the Pakistani government implemented a judicial reform that cost $350Â million or 0.1% of Pakistan's 2002 GDP. This reform did not involve increased incentives for judges to improve efficiency but merely provided them with more training. Nonetheless, the reform had dramatic effects on judicial efficiency and consequently on entrepreneurship: judges disposed of a quarter more cases and entry rate of new firms increased by half due to the reform. Using data from the World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database, our estimates suggest that this translates into an increase of Pakistan's GDP by 0.5%.

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  • Chemin, Matthieu, 2009. "The impact of the judiciary on entrepreneurship: Evaluation of Pakistan's "Access to Justice Programme"," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 114-125, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:93:y:2009:i:1-2:p:114-125
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    Cited by:

    1. Emanuela Carbonara & Enrico Santarelli & Hien Thu Tran, 2016. "De jure determinants of new firm formation: how the pillars of constitutions influence entrepreneurship," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 139-162, June.
    2. Stefan Voigt, 2016. "Determinants of judicial efficiency: a survey," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 183-208, October.
    3. Raffaela Giordano & Sergi Lanau & Pietro Tommasino & Petia Topalova, 2015. "Does Public Sector Inefficiency Constrain Firm Productivity; Evidence from Italian Provinces," IMF Working Papers 15/168, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Miguel García-Posada & Juan Mora-Sanguinetti, 2015. "Entrepreneurship and enforcement institutions: disaggregated evidence for Spain," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 49-74, August.
    5. Samantha Bielen & Peter Grajzl & Wim Marneffe, 2017. "Understanding the Time to Court Case Resolution: A Competing Risks Analysis Using Belgian Data," CESifo Working Paper Series 6450, CESifo Group Munich.
    6. Gani Aldashev, 2009. "Legal institutions, political economy, and development," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(2), pages 257-270, Summer.
    7. Guilherme Lichand & Rodrigo R. Soares, 2014. "Access to Justice and Entrepreneurship: Evidence from Brazil's Special Civil Tribunals," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(2), pages 459-499.
    8. Roberto Ippoliti & Alessandro Melcarne & Giovanni Ramello, 2015. "Judicial efficiency and entrepreneurs’ expectations on the reliability of European legal systems," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 75-94, August.
    9. Roberto Ippoliti, 2015. "La riforma della geografia giudiziaria: efficienza tecnica e domanda di giustizia," ECONOMIA PUBBLICA, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2015(2), pages 91-124.
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    11. Florence Kondylis & Mattea Stein, 2018. "The Speed of Justice," PSE Working Papers halshs-01735025, HAL.
    12. repec:ces:ifodic:v:12:y:2014:i:3:p:19131886 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Mawussé K. N. Okey, 2011. "Institutional Reforms, Private Sector, and Economic Growth in Africa," WIDER Working Paper Series 040, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    14. Stefan Voigt & Nora El-Bialy, 2016. "Identifying the determinants of aggregate judicial performance: taxpayers’ money well spent?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 283-319, April.
    15. Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti & Marta Martínez-Matute & Miguel García-Posada, 2017. "Credit, crisis and contract enforcement: evidence from the Spanish loan market," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 361-383, October.
    16. Ioana PETRESCU, 2016. "Size Matters: Entrepreneurship and Institutions," Management Dynamics in the Knowledge Economy Journal, College of Management, National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, vol. 4(1), pages 63-80, March.
    17. Peter Grajzl, 2014. "Behind the Courts’ Walls: Empirical Insights from Slovenia," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(3), pages 39-44, October.
    18. Castellaneta, Francesco & Conti, Raffaele & Veloso, Francisco M. & Kemeny, Carlos A., 2016. "The effect of trade secret legal protection on venture capital investments: Evidence from the inevitable disclosure doctrine," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 524-541.
    19. Romain Espinosa & Claudine Desrieux & Hengrui Wan, 2017. "Fewer courts, less justice? Evidence from the 2008 French reform of labor courts," Post-Print halshs-01634211, HAL.
    20. Miguel García-Posada & Juan Mora-Sanguinetti, 2015. "Does (average) size matter? Court enforcement, business demography and firm growth," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 639-669, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Legal system Entrepreneurship;

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship

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