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The Impact of the Judiciary on Economic Activity

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  • Matthieu Chemin

Abstract

This paper examines the consequences of slow judiciaries on firms' contracting behaviour in India. After deriving testable implications from a game theoretical model, I examine how case pendency rates in India's state courts affect the contracting behaviour of 170,000 small non-agricultural informal firms from the 2000 National Sample Survey's 55th round. I find that a slow judiciary implies more breaches of contract, discourages firms from undertaking relationship-specific investments, impedes firms' access to formal financial institutions, and favours inefficient dynasties. Moving a firm from the highest to the lowest pendency state would result in a 10% improvement in firm performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthieu Chemin, 2007. "The Impact of the Judiciary on Economic Activity," Cahiers de recherche 0724, CIRPEE.
  • Handle: RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0724
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Rohini Pande & Christopher Udry, 2005. "Institutions and Development:A View from Below," Working Papers 928, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
    2. Soldatos, Gerasimos T., 2015. "Law, Coercion, And Socioeconomic Equilibrium," MPRA Paper 68953, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Sujata Visaria, 2009. "Legal Reform and Loan Repayment: The Microeconomic Impact of Debt Recovery Tribunals in India," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(3), pages 59-81, July.
    4. Gerasimos T. SOLDATOS, 2015. "Law, Coercion And Socioeconomic Equilibrium," Review of Economic and Business Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, issue 16, pages 39-50, December.
    5. Grigor Sukiassyan & Jeffrey Nugent, 2008. "Associations versus registration as alternative strategies of small firms," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 147-161, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Law and economics; Institutions; Courts; Contracts; Industrial Organisation; Economic Growth; Industrial Performance;

    JEL classification:

    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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