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Courts and Banks: Effects of Judicial Enforcement on Credit Markets

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Abstract

The costs of enforcing contracts is a key determinant of market performance. We document this point with reference to the credit market. We start by presenting a model of opportunistic debtors and inefficient courts. According to the model, improvements in judicial efficiency reduce credit rationing and increase lending, while have an ambiguous effect on interest rates, depending on banking competition and on the type of judicial reform. These predictions are supported by panel data on Italian provinces and by cross-country evidence. In Italian provinces with longer trials or large backlogs of pending trials, credit is less widely available than elsewhere. International evidence also shows that the depth of mortgage markets is inversely related to costs of mortgage foreclosure and other proxies for judicial inefficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Magda Bianco & Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, 2001. "Courts and Banks: Effects of Judicial Enforcement on Credit Markets," CSEF Working Papers 58, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 09 Apr 2002.
  • Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:58
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    1. Reint Gropp & John Karl Scholz & Michelle J. White, 1997. "Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 217-251.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    enforcement; judicial efficiency; credit market; lending; interest rates;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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