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Corporate disclosure determinants: a cross-country investigation

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  • Farina, Vincenzo

Abstract

The wave of bankruptcies that have followed one upon the other in recent years as the consequence of financial scandals and the integration among the financial systems of various countries have given rise to a search for mechanisms suitable for protecting investors and regulating growing capital flows. More and more frequently, scholars are looking upon the disclosure as a very important tool within the context of the said mechanisms. The factors affecting the actual disclosure levels are analyzed through an empirical verification based on data relative to a sample of 45 countries. The initial evidence suggests that disclosure is affected both by the efficiency in the application of the judicial procedures and by factors directly connected with the national culture.

Suggested Citation

  • Farina, Vincenzo, 2005. "Corporate disclosure determinants: a cross-country investigation," MPRA Paper 5676, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:5676
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate Disclosure; Judicial Enforcement; National Culture;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

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