Corporate disclosure determinants: a cross-country investigation
The wave of bankruptcies that have followed one upon the other in recent years as the consequence of financial scandals and the integration among the financial systems of various countries have given rise to a search for mechanisms suitable for protecting investors and regulating growing capital flows. More and more frequently, scholars are looking upon the disclosure as a very important tool within the context of the said mechanisms. The factors affecting the actual disclosure levels are analyzed through an empirical verification based on data relative to a sample of 45 countries. The initial evidence suggests that disclosure is affected both by the efficiency in the application of the judicial procedures and by factors directly connected with the national culture.
|Date of creation:||2005|
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