IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Political Economy of Finance

If the private benefits of control are high and management owns a small equity stake, managers and workers are natural allies. There are two forces at play. First, managers effectively transform employees into a “poison pill’’ by signing generous long-term labor contracts and thereby reducing the firm’s attractiveness to a raider. Second, employees act as “white squires’’ for the incumbent managers, lobbying against hostile takeovers to protect the high wages enjoyed under incumbent management. Our model is consistent with available empirical findings, and yields new predictions as well.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.csef.it/WP/wp76.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy in its series CSEF Working Papers with number 76.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2001
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2001, pages 502-519
Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:76
Contact details of provider: Postal: I-80126 Napoli
Phone: +39 081 - 675372
Fax: +39 081 - 675372
Web page: http://www.csef.it/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Alexander Ljungqvist & Tim Jenkinson & William Wilhelm, 2001. "Global Integration in Primary Equity Markets: The Role of U.S. Banks and U.S. Investors," OFRC Working Papers Series 2001fe06, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
  2. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2000. "The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th Century," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 265, OECD Publishing.
  3. Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, 1999. "The Political Economy of Corporate Governance," CSEF Working Papers 29, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 01 Jul 2005.
  4. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1996. "Financial Dependence and Growth," NBER Working Papers 5758, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Jayaratne, Jith & Strahan, Philip E, 1996. "The Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence from Bank Branch Deregulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(3), pages 639-70, August.
  6. Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, . "Law and Finance," Working Paper 19451, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  7. Pagano, Marco & Volpin, Paolo, 2002. "The Political Economy of Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers 3231, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Alston, Lee J, 1984. "Farm Foreclosure Moratorium Legislation: A Lesson from the Past," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 445-57, June.
  9. Jones, Steven L. & Megginson, William L. & Nash, Robert C. & Netter, Jeffry M., 1999. "Share issue privatizations as financial means to political and economic ends," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 217-253, August.
  10. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," NBER Working Papers 5879, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Bruno Biais & Enrico Perotti, 2002. "Machiavellian Privatization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 240-258, March.
  12. Tiroley, Jean, 2000. "Corporate Governance," CEI Working Paper Series 2000-1, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  13. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, 2000. "The End Of History For Corporate Law," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm136, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Feb 2001.
  14. Cornelia Holthausen & Thomas Rønde, 2003. "Cooperation in International Banking Supervision," CIE Discussion Papers 2004-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  15. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1999. "Corporate Governance and Competition," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 99-28, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  16. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521781640 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. Wendy Carlin & Colin Mayer, 1999. "Finance, Investment and Growth," OFRC Working Papers Series 1999fe09, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
  18. Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, 2002. "The World Price of Insider Trading," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 75-108, 02.
  19. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 2000. "Unnatural Experiments? Estimating the Incidence of Endogenous Policies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(467), pages F672-94, November.
  20. Jeffry M. Netter & William L. Megginson, 2001. "From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 321-389, June.
  21. Enrico Perotti & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 2002. "The Political Economy of Bank- and Market Dominance," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 02.14, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP, revised Apr 2003.
  22. Edward Glaeser & Simon Johnson & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Coase Versus The Coasians," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(3), pages 853-899, August.
  23. Randall S. Kroszner, 2000. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 158, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  24. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2000. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," NBER Working Papers 7582, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  25. Beck, Thorsten & Levine, Ross & Loayza, Norman, 1999. "Finance and the sources of growth," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2057, The World Bank.
  26. Pagano, Marco & Volpin, Paolo, 2002. "Managers, Workers and Corporate Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 3649, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  27. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3125520 is not listed on IDEAS
  28. Perotti, Enrico C, 1995. "Credible Privatization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 847-59, September.
  29. Mark J. Roe, 1997. "The Political Roots Of American Corporate Finance," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 9(4), pages 8-22.
  30. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2000. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," CRSP working papers 512, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
  31. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 1999. "What Drives Deregulation? Economics And Politics Of The Relaxation Of Bank Branching Restrictions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1437-1467, November.
  32. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Vojislav Maksimovic, 1998. "Law, Finance, and Firm Growth," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(6), pages 2107-2137, December.
  33. Bernardo Bortolotti & Domenico Siniscalco & Marcella Fantini, 2000. "Privatisation and Institutions: A Cross Country Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series 375, CESifo Group Munich.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:76. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lia Ambrosio)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.